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ABSTRACT
The current study extends the application of Personality Systems Interactions
(PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000b) to the distinction between Nonsuicidal Self-injury (NSSI) and
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) by examining the effect o f State Orientation
(Kuhl, 1994) on emotion dysregulation, BPD, and NSSI. Participants were recruited
using social media and internet-based snowball techniques. Participants were directed to
a web-based survey consisting o f a demographic questionnaire, the Action Control Scale
-24 (ACS-24; Kuhl, 1994; Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998), the Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gratz and Roemer, 2008), the McLean
Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder (MSI-BPD; Zanarini et al.,
2003), and the Inventory o f Statements About Self-injury (ISAS; Klonsky & Glenn,
2009; Klonsky & Olino, 2008). Path analysis was used to test a mediation model in
which State Orientation had direct effects on emotion dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and
NSSI behaviors, and indirect effects on BPD symptoms and NSSI behaviors through
emotion dysregulation. The hypothesized model suggested the relationship between BPD
symptoms and NSSI behaviors is mediated by the total effects specified in the model.
Results indicated that the specified model demonstrated marginal model-data
correspondence and was not supported. The retained model (a theory consistent model)
depicted direct effects o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation, but not on BPD
symptoms or NSSI behaviors. However, results indicated an indirect effect o f State

Orientation on BPD symptoms and NSSI behaviors. These findings are consistent with
previous research suggesting that NSSI may be a distinct disorder, specifically, separate
from BPD. Future research should attempt to replicate the findings of the current study
and/or test the originally proposed model with alternate populations (e.g., undergraduate
college students, clinical samples o f various ages, and youth). Additionally, future
research should incorporate other aspects o f PSI theory into the NSSI and BPD literature
Clinical implications include early identification and subsequent intervention, as well as
improved conceptualization o f client characteristics.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Historically, self-injury has been considered by some to be pathognomonic (i.e.,
specifically characteristic or indicative of a particular condition) o f Borderline
Personality Disorder (Bomovalova, Levy, Gratz, & Lejuez, 2010; Linehan, 1993).
Clinically, the relationship between self-injury and Borderline Personality Disorder
(BPD) frequently has led to unnecessary hospitalization and, in many cases, specialized,
long-term treatment interventions (Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010). Recent research suggests
that many individuals who engage in self-injurious behavior do not meet full criteria for
Borderline Personality Disorder (Klonsky & Olino, 2008; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Nock,
Joiner, Gordon, Lloyd-Richardson, & Prinstein, 2006; Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010;
Zlotnick et al., 1997). Other research indicates self-injury and Borderline Personality
Disorder are significantly associated with emotion dysregulation (Adrian, Zeman, Erdley,
Lisa, & Sim, 2011; Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2006; Selby, Bender,
Gordon, Nock, & Joiner, 2012; Selby & Joiner, 2009). Furthermore, evidence suggests
the relationship between self-injury and BPD is, at least partially, mediated by emotion
dysregulation (Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2006; Selby et al., 2012; Selby & Joiner,
2009). A better understanding of the relationships among emotion dysregulation, selfinjury, and Borderline Personality Disorder is warranted (American Psychiatric-
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Association, 2013). The current study extends Personality Systems Interactions theory to
examine the effects o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation, BPD, self-injury, and
the relationships among them.
Proponents o f the distinction between self-injury and Borderline Personality
Disorder sought inclusion o f Nonsuicidal Self-injury in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual o f Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association,
2013); however, Nonsuicidal Self-injury (NSSI) was not added as a unique disorder;
rather, it was added to Section III (i.e., the appendix) o f the manual. Although the reasons
for this decision remain unclear, inclusion o f Nonsuicidal Self-injury in section III o f the
manual indicates the behavior is a condition in need o f further research. Interestingly,
extensive changes to the proposed diagnostic criteria for the Personality Disorders (i.e., a
dimensional approach) were tabled, and the criteria for personality disorders remain as
they were in the DSM-IV-TR. Although the “new” criteria were not adopted in the current
manual, these criteria were added to section III o f the DSM-5, indicating the “new”
criteria are also “in need o f further research.”
Given emotion dysregulation has been associated with Borderline Personality
Disorder and Nonsuicidal Self-injury, as well as a variety o f other dysregulated
behaviors, assessment o f one’s perceived ability to manage his or her emotions is
essential to establishing an adequate conceptual framework for Nonsuicidal Self-injury.
According to Baumann, Kaschel, and Kuhl (2007), individuals who are easily aroused to
a negative affective state and possess a diminished ability for self-relaxation (i.e., State
Orientation) may exhibit more maladaptive avoidance behaviors (e.g., Nonsuicidal Self

injury), suggesting State Orientation may be a risk factor for engagement in dysregulated
behavior.
Recent research suggests emotion dysregulation is a motivational force behind
self-injury and Borderline Personality Disorder (Adrian et al., 2011; Gratz & Roemer,
2008; Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2009; Iverson, Follette, Pistorello, &
Fruzzetti, 2012; Selby & Joiner, 2009). In an effort to clarify underlying characteristics
that may lead to emotion dysregulation and subsequent dysregulated behavior, the current
study examines the effects o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation, Nonsuicidal
Self-injury, and Borderline Personality Disorder.

Personality Systems Interactions Theory
Personality research examines the relationships between individual differences
and behavioral consequences as well as how these personality features are developed
(Kuhl, 2000a). The dispositional level o f personality examines the individual on the trait
level or across various individual characteristics (McAdams, 2006). Neurobiological
perspectives (Corr, 2004; Farmer & Goldberg, 2008) define individual differences as
having their origins in temperament (i.e., innate biological tendencies). Temperamental
tendencies include traits such as sensitivity to reinforcement and/or punishment (Corr,
2004), introversion versus extraversion (Corr, 2004; Farmer & Goldberg, 2008), and
affect sensitivity (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2007; Kuhl & Koole, 2008). Other
approaches apply more elaborate cognitively constructed concepts such as beliefs, values,
and self-appraisal (Baumeister, 1991). Implicit beliefs related to an individual’s inner
experience (e.g., episodic memories) are aspects of the holistic self (Kuhl, 2000a), and
the holistic self is the source o f affective stability and action control.

Personality Systems Interactions (PSI) theory is a comprehensive personality
theory that integrates existing theories and neurobiological findings to explain behavior
(Kuhl, 2000a, 2000b, 2011; Quirin, Kaze, Kuhl, & Kazen, 2009). PSI theory differs from
other theories in that it focuses on the interactions between mental systems and provides a
functional analysis o f these system interactions. PSI theory coherently integrates
subcognitive and metacognitive aspects of action control and self-regulation into the
currently existing cognitive constructs explaining motivation, extending classical models
of personality rather than replacing them (Kuhl, Kazen, & Koole, 2006). Kuhl
distinguishes these dynamic motivational concepts from traditional cognitive
representations o f motivation such as expectations beliefs, and values (Baumeister,
1991). PSI theory does not replace classical motivation theory, rather it challenges a
cognitive reductionist perspective (Kuhl, 2011). Similar to the Emotional Cascade theory,
an individual’s response to a particular stimulus is moderated by his or her thoughts and
feelings in a circular fashion (Selby & Joiner, 2009). PSI theory extends motivational
theory to include action control and self-regulation.

Systems Conditioning
Within the PSI framework, adequate self-regulation of emotional states is a result
o f systems conditioning (Kuhl, 2011). Systems conditioning refers to the strengthening of
the neural pathways between the areas o f the brain associated with the holistic self (e.g.,
the right medial prefrontal cortex) and an affect regulating system associated with reward
and punishment (e.g., part of the limbic system). As with other theories, according to PSI
theory, these pathways are developed through adequate interpersonal responsivity from
caregivers during early development.

5
Affective learning originates in infancy and leads to the development of affective
dispositions. Initially infants experience affect through affective sharing (i.e., the
temporary adoption o f the caregiver’s affective experience during parent-child
interactions). These opportunities occur during parent-child play activities such as pattycake and peek-a-boo (Jemberg & Booth, 2001). For example, when playing peek-a-boo,
infants who have not developed object permanence momentarily experience aloneness
and subsequent reunification; these interactions are accompanied by parental expressions
o f happiness, excitement, and interest that signal the “appropriate” response to
reunification (i.e., positive affect). In this way, one’s affective repertoire is developed
through the dyadic interactions o f early childhood.
According to PSI theory, this affective repertoire is the foundation upon which
more elaborate cognitive systems are built (Kuhl, 2000b). PSI theory explains personality
according to the systems interactions that originate with the affective repertoire
developed during infancy. Kuhl further argues that the interactions facilitating the
generation o f positive affect and the down-regulation of negative affect outside the
context o f the self are insufficient to adequately develop these pathways. However, the
quality o f these interactions is essential to healthy development in terms o f adequate
action control and self-growth.
If people do not develop emotional autonomy, they will rely on others’ emotions
through emotional contagion (i.e., emotional symbiosis) to regulate their affect (Kuhl,
2000a). Individuals who rely on others’ (typically their partner’s) affect to regulate their
own affect exhibit what Kuhl refers to as a symbiotic affective preference. He further
argues that a symbiotic affective preference may be a result o f an inadequately developed
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holistic self. In other words, individuals prone to emotional dysregulation may rely on
their partners to regulate their emotions resulting in an increased sense o f attachment to
one’s partner when the partner’s affect is facilitative and available. However, the
perseveration o f negative affect is likely to ensue if the partner’s affect is not facilitative
or available. This dependence is likely to lead to increased fears of abandonment.
Individuals with high affiliative needs may have a propensity for symbiosis, which may
lead to interpersonal strife.

The Development of Disposition
Affective disposition, similar if not synonymous with dispositional traits
(McAdams, 2006), is developed in early infancy during affective learning. Adequate
affective learning associated with the self-regulatory and non-defensive (selfconfrontational) down-regulation o f negative affect leads to the development of
emotional autonomy. Emotional autonomy is developed through systems conditioning;
PSI theory posits systems conditioning is an affective form o f conditioning in which
associative pathways in the brain are developed leading to affect regulatory dispositions.
In other words, one’s ability to down-regulate negative affect is neurobiologically
facilitated by adequate affective sharing and resultant affective learning during infancy.
Specifically, it is the external control o f the child’s emotions by caregivers, which is
gradually internalized and integrated into the self, provided the self is active during
external regulation of the child’s affective state. Whenever the child does not “open up”
and express his or her emotions (i.e., when the self is not activated), external regulation
cannot be integrated into the self and cannot become a self-competence. This perspective
is consistent with Linehan’s (1993) predisposing conditions leading to Borderline
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Personality Disorder and, in particular, the development o f emotion dysregulation and
subsequent self-injurious behavior.
Dispositional low positive affect coupled with dispositional high negative affect is
especially debilitating when both action control and self-regulation are impeded (Kuhl,
2011). This phenomenon seems quite similar to previous descriptions of individuals with
Borderline Personality Disorder (Linehan, 1993), especially those who engage in selfinjurious behavior. According to this argument, individuals with Borderline Personality
Disorder lack the ability to integrate negative feedback into the self-representational
system (Kuhl, 2000a, 2011). Specifically, they are not able to down-regulate the negative
affect aroused by aversive stimuli in order facilitate self-growth from the novel or
discrepant information. In other words, individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder
may be described as state oriented.
Dispositional high negative affect, dispositional low positive affect, and negative
affect sensitivity, are conceptually similar to anhedonia. Neuroticism, which is
characterized by affect lability, anxiety, angry hostility, low positive affect (i.e.,
depression), impulsiveness, and perceived vulnerability is associated with self-injury
(Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; LeBoeuf-Davis & Mitchell, 2012; Melvin, Weinstock,
Andover, Spirito, & Yen, 2012) as well as Borderline Personality Disorder (Bomovalova
et al., 2010; Kuhl, 2000a, 2011). According to Baumann and colleagues (2007), improved
self-relaxation leads to decreased negative affect and improved self-motivation leads to
increased positive affect. Baumann and colleagues predicted and found that the
commonly observed increased risk o f developing psychosomatic symptoms associated
with high neuroticism (i.e., high sensitivity for negative affect) compared to individuals
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with low neuroticism turns into an enhanced protection against those symptoms when
self-regulation o f affect is well-developed; presumably, high sensitivity becomes a source
o f facilitated self-development when it can be counter-regulated (Baumann et al., 2007).
These results show promise for the conceptualization of individualized treatment options
(e.g., interventions that improve self-relaxation and/or self-motivation skills). However,
these results are limited to college students within a single semester and should be
examined with a more general sample.
In addition to the dispositional level of personality, McAdams (2006)
contextualizes individual patterns o f behavior (i.e., characteristic adaptations) within a
motivational, cognitive, and developmental framework. In other words, domain specific
skills utilized to achieve a goal are examples o f characteristic adaptations that have
developed over time. Although these skills sets are developed over time and across
settings, individual differences influence the presentation of characteristic adaptations. In
other words, characteristic adaptations are contextual skill sets derived from dispositional
traits.
Recent research argues personality development is a synergistic interaction
between two-polarities (i.e., self- definition and interpersonal relatedness) across the
lifespan (Luyten & Blatt, 2013). Self-definition is a developmental dimension of
personality that can be examined across several disciplines including cognitive,
evolutionary, cross-cultural, personality, and social psychology as well as philosophy and
neurobiology. Interpersonal relatedness is the other pole central to personality
development. Self-definition interacts with interpersonal relatedness to develop normal
and/or disrupted personality presentation.
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According to PSI theory, affect sensitivity and self-regulation interact in relatively
stable and consistent ways; these interaction patterns represent dispositional traits
(Baumann et al., 2007). The mechanisms that influence self-regulation are examined
within the context of action control theory. The connections between affective learning
and cognitive styles result in the development of what McAdams (2006) refers to as
dispositional traits and characteristics adaptations. Action control is composed of
strategies such as attention control, motivation control, emotion control, and coping with
failure, which are utilized to maintain difficult intentions. Self-control (inner dictator) can
be thought o f as efforts to enact an intention via the inhibition of thoughts related to
desirable alternatives, whereas self-regulation (inner democracy) involves attention to
and satisfaction o f the holistic self.

Cognitive Macrosystems
PSI theory proposes four cognitive macrosystems, two of which operate on an
elementary level and two o f which operate on a more advanced level (Kuhl, 2000a,
2000b). The two elementary macrosystems o f PSI theory include intuitive behavior
control and object recognition; the two higher-level macrosystems include intention
memory and extension memory. Intuitive behavior control is a low inference behavioral
system and object recognition is a low inference experiential system. Intention memory is
a high inference behavioral system and extension memory is a high inference experiential
system. The low inference systems can be described within the cognitive science context
and the high inference systems can be thought of as characteristic adaptations.
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Higher-Level Macrosystems
Intention memory is an explicit representation of behavioral intentions (Kuhl,
2000b). Intention memory can be thought o f as an essential component of an integrated
network o f subsystems that gird analytical thinking, verbal processing, and executive
functioning (i.e., planning functions). Specifically, behavioral inhibition o f the enactment
o f an intention until an adequate opportunity presents itself is an essential function of
intention memory. Analytical thinking is associated with competition between
alternatives rather than an integration o f alternatives. The analytical thinking associated
with intention memory allows an individual to form explicit representations of intended
actions and store them for future reference when an opportunity to enact the intention
becomes available. These explicit representations are processed in the left prefrontal
cortex, whereas the right prefrontal cortex processes the elicitation and inhibition of
emotions. Extension memory is an implicit representation o f the integrated self-system
(Kuhl, 2000b). Hyperactivation of intention memory leads to hypoactivation o f extension
memory, thereby limiting one’s ability to flexibly respond to challenges encountered
before or during the enactment of a difficult intention. Affective states are a result of
either unconscious processing o f conditioned or innate stimuli, or conscious processing of
cognitions; both result in individualized affective responses to stimuli.
Intention memory and extension memory interact to accommodate and/or
integrate information into the holistic self. Intense stimulation o f intention memory
inhibits the activation o f and access to extension memory, thereby hindering access to
experiential aspects o f the self. Neurobiological findings support the proposed direct and
indirect routes for affective processing supports this argument (LeDoux, 1995). The

direct route explains subcognitive processing of affective stimuli, and the indirect route
explains cognitive processing of stimuli. The direct route involves the activation o f the
amygdala without extensive cortical activation, whereas the indirect route involves affect
modulation via the activation o f more extensive cortical structures.

Two Modulation Assumptions
PSI theory is composed o f two modulation assumptions: the Volitional
Facilitation Assumption and the Self Facilitation Assumption (Kuhl, 2000b). The first
modulation assumption (i.e., the Volitional Facilitation Assumption) asserts that positive
affect allows for the activation of intuitive behavior control, which initiates the enactment
o f a goal held in the intention memory system. Down-regulation o f positive affect
facilitates maintenance o f intention memory and subsequent access to intuitive behavior
control. According to PSI theory, intentions are meaningful to the extent that they
contribute to the conceptualization o f the holistic self, which is composed of an
individual's needs, values, and beliefs about oneself and his or her ability to initiate and
enact an intention (Kuhl, 2000b). The two assumptions are the core o f PSI theory and the
mechanisms o f interaction between the affective-cognitive systems.
The first modulation assumption explains how intention memory and the behavior
control system can be increased by positive affect. The interaction between these two
systems is referred to as action control, that is, the ability to up-regulate positive affect
and down-regulate negative affect in order to function effectively. Research supporting
this assumption includes studies in which action control is experimentally facilitated via
external cues priming positive affect (Kuhl, 2011). Specifically, self-regulation as
measured by the Stroop task increased following priming positive affect.
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The second modulation assumption (i.e., the Self Facilitation Assumption) posits
that the down-regulation o f negative affect facilitates access to extension memory.
Access to extension memory allows current stimuli to be examined within the context of
currently held self-representations (i.e., various aspects o f the holistic self, relevant to the
current stimuli). Access to extension memory facilitates the inhibition of unexpected or
unwanted stimuli recognized by the object recognition system. The premise of the second
modulation assumption is that a well-developed self-system facilitates the regulation of
negative affect via activation of relevant self-representational knowledge (Kuhl, 2000a,
2000b, 2011). That is, an individual with an adequately developed holistic self would be
able to counter the effects of aversive feedback regarding the self, with previously stored
aspects o f the self and integrate the discrepant feedback into a holistic self. A stable selfrepresentational system can tolerate discrepant or novel stimuli, integrate it into future
decision-making, and balance it with an accurate assessment of one’s integrated selfrepresentational system (Kuhl, 2000a, 2000b).
The second modulation assumption o f PSI theory posits that negative affect
inhibits access to the holistic self (extension memory), thereby interfering with the
interchanges between the holistic self and the experiential system, that is, object
recognition (Kuhl, 2000a, 2000b, 2011). Based on the second modulation assumption a
functional deficit is a result o f impaired self-regulation, specifically the ability to downregulate negative affect once activated. In essence, the second modulation assumption
explains how once negative affect is activated rumination ensues, hindering access to the
holistic self. Kuhl (2011) argues self-relaxation, a specific aspect of self-regulation
necessary to down-regulate negative affect, is a form o f high level avoidance motivation.

Further, self-motivation, a specific aspect of self-regulation necessary to tolerate a
temporary decrease in positive affect, is a form o f high-level approach motivation.
Findings support the paradoxical contention that hesitant individuals have a sensitized
mechanism that facilitates recognition o f intention related stimuli (i.e., stimuli associated
with an unsatisfied goal; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). Hesitation can be thought o f as
behavioral inhibition related to the initiation o f a difficult intention, and is associated with
subclinical avolition.
Self-regulation describes one's ability to increase and/or decrease positive or
negative affect in order to maintain momentum toward a goal held in intention memory
(Baumann et al., 2007). Self-regulation is the management o f one's own affect in order to
facilitate continued progress toward a desired goal despite challenges throughout the
process and is grounded in the two modulation assumptions (Kuhl, 2000a). Negative
affect may be a primary and intense reaction to aversive stimuli for individuals high on
neuroticism, anxiety, and other dimensions of personality. Mechanisms that impact self
regulation include: emotion control, attention control, motivation control, state
orientation, and self-access. When multiple mechanisms are impaired, one's ability to
function becomes impaired, that is, action control is impaired (Kuhl, 2000b). Self
regulation is not a single construct, but rather an amalgam o f several action control
mechanisms with a plethora o f possible interactions. According to PSI theory,
characteristic adaptations are caused by the two modulation assumptions (Kuhl, 2000a).
Consistent with Linehan’s (1993) invaliding environment, which she posits leads
to self-injurious behavior in individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder, Kuhl
(2011) argues invalidation o f experience during early development leads to impaired
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action control and self-regulation. Kuhl argues dysregulated behavior, such as self-injury,
may function to facilitate positive affect, specifically relief, which is reinforced by
avoidance o f an aversive state (avoidance motivation); alternately, this phenomenon
could be attributed to approach motivation in that relief is a rewarding experience
(Klonsky, 2012). Self-control involves the enactment o f an unattractive instrumental
behavior, for example, initiating an odious task.
Recent research has found inconsistent results regarding affect sensitivity and
dysregulated behavior (Franklin et al., 2010; Glenn, Blumenthal, Klonsky, & Hajcak,
2011), however, affect regulation is more directly related to symptom development than
affect sensitivity (Baumann et al., 2007; Kuhl, 2000a, 2011). Specifically, self-relaxation
(i.e., the ability to down-regulate negative affect) is essential to self-growth. Individuals
with dispositional negative affect possess greater object recognition for difficult to
integrate stimuli. In other words, elevated negative trait affect leads to increased
recognition of stimuli that lead to increased negative state affect; furthermore, these
individuals tend to struggle to integrate these aversive experiences and self-growth is
subsequently stifled (Kuhl, 2000a).
Individuals with a greater disposition for positive affect may be able to avoid
experiencing negative affect through the activation of positive affect; it is important to
recognize the neurobiological underpinnings of this process, that is, the activation of the
brain’s pleasure center (Kuhl, 2000a). In contrast, others may intellectualize or engage in
compulsive behavior, to avoid or reduce negative affect, respectively. Although these
techniques work with mild to moderate negative affect, when intense activation of
negative affect occurs these avoidance motivated methods fail to down-regulate negative
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affect. In other words, intense activation of negative affect requires integration o f the
aversive experience into the self-system (i.e., the holistic self)- Kuhl argues these
avoidance motivated techniques are what psychoanalytic theorists would refer to as
immature defense mechanisms. Individuals with avoidant tendencies typically do not rely
on symbiotic relationships to facilitate down-regulation of negative affect. Likewise,
Kuhl argues that self-regulation competence moderates the need for symbiosis and in
negatively associated with a state oriented affective disposition.
Luyten and Blatt (2013) argue interpersonal relatedness and self-definition and
their interactions may have greater explanatory power than traits such as negative
affectivity/neuroticism and extraversion. These findings suggest interactions between
individual characteristics may be as important as the traits themselves in explaining
dysregulated behavior patterns. Evidence for the importance of these traits can be seen in
the proposed changes to the Personality Disorders diagnostic criteria currently included
in Section III of the DSM-5; specifically, the interpersonal and self elements of
personality functioning. State Orientation is an aspect of the self, in that it affects one’s
capacity to access one’s identity and subsequently exert self-direction, that is, State
Orientation impairs access to one’s holistic self and the ability to employ action control.

State Orientation
State Orientation is a dispositional state following activation of negative affect
that results in uncontrollable rumination, that is impaired ability to terminate ruminative
states (whereas sensitivity toward negative affect enhances the frequency rather than the
duration o f NA). Based on the second modulation assumption, state oriented individuals
may be prone to uncontrollable rumination that inhibits problem solving (Kuhl, 2000a,
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2011). The second modulation assumption may explain aspects o f Nonsuicidal Selfinjury as well as Borderline Personality Disorder; specifically, State Orientation (i.e.,
inadequate self-relaxation) may lead to both Nonsuicidal Self-injury and Borderline
Personality Disorder.
In contrast, State Orientation is the degree to which an individual's affective state
hinders one’s ability to initiate a difficult intention (Kuhl, 2000a). State Orientation is
associated with affective lability, which interferes with challenging intention enactment.
These findings suggest individuals high in affect sensitivity (e.g., affective lability) may
be especially sensitive to stimuli related to an unfulfilled intention, leading to higher
levels o f negative affectivity. The subconscious activation of intention memory leads to
an increase in negative affect and a decrease in positive affect. Access to self
representations stored in extension memory relevant to the unfulfilled intention is
essential to optimal functioning; one must possess the ability to down-regulate the
negative affect aroused to the extent that he/she can access relevant aspect o f the holistic
self.
Kuhl (2000a) argued affective sensitivity, or more specifically, a low positive
affect disposition or high negative affect disposition is pathological when associated with
insufficient affect-regulatory functioning. This contention emphasizes the importance of
intact affect regulation. In fact, as mentioned above, greater sensitivity for negative affect
can be facilitative for self-development given the individuals has developed adequate
self-regulation (Baumann et al., 2007) or has been exposed to supportive developmental
conditions promoting emotional autonomy (Belsky & Pluess, 2009). A greater sensitivity
for stimuli that challenges the existing self-representations facilitates accommodation and
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assimilation o f discrepant or novel information relevant to the developing self-systems.
O f course, subsequent down-regulation o f negative affect is a prerequisite for the
integration o f aversive stimuli, detected by the object recognition system, into the holistic
self (i.e., the self-representational system).
According to PSI theory, emotional flexibility is essential to cognitive flexibility,
which in turn is a prerequisite for adaptive personality functioning. That is, adaptive
personality functioning is essential to effective personality systems interactions. As with
many psychological constructs, state orientation is beneficial when appropriate and when
the individual can oscillate between the down-regulation of negative affect and the upregulation o f positive affect in order to initiate difficult intentions. However, when an
individual is unable to escape the state oriented mode when doing so would be beneficial
psychological well-being is impacted (Baumann et al., 2007; Kuhl, 1994). State
Orientation is composed o f two dimensions: preoccupation and hesitation. State
Orientation is “the inability to escape a mode o f control in which the intention of
intended behavior is difficult, either as a result o f preoccupation (AOF), or as a result of
hesitation (AOD) o f a hypothetical supervising system which controls the initiation of
planned behavior” (Kuhl, 1994, pg. 51). Preoccupation is a ruminative aspect o f State
Orientation and hesitation is a motivational aspect of State Orientation.

Emotion Dysregulation
In order to understand emotion dysregulation, one must define the self, emotion
regulation, emotion dysregulation, and related factors such as distress tolerance and
experiential avoidance. The self, according to Baumeister (1991), is the conceptual notion
conjured when one uses terms such as “I,” “me,” or “my.” According to this definition,

the self is the combination o f roles, values, beliefs, etc. an individual considers self
relevant when using these terms. Through development, the self becomes more elaborate
integrating more roles, and changing beliefs and values. The roles a person identifies with
represent aspects o f the self that may be challenged or threatened at times. When the self
is challenged by loss o f a role, for example, the urge to escape the self is activated
(Baumeister, 1991). Often this urge is intensified when others observe the loss. Methods
of escape include alcohol (and substance) abuse, Masochism, self-injury, binge eating,
and suicide, which Baumeister contends is the ultimate escape from the self.
Linehan’s (1993) three-dimensional model of emotion dysregulation suggests an
etiological basis rooted in a biological predisposition (i.e., greater sensitivity to negative
emotional arousal, greater arousal following activation o f negative emotions, and a
delayed return to baseline affect) coupled with environmental factors that impair
adequate development o f coping skills. According to Gratz and Roemer (2004), emotion
regulation is a multidimensional trait consisting of acceptance, goal-directedness,
awareness, clarity, strategies, and behavioral inhibition (i.e., the ability to refrain from
engaging in dysregulated behavior) when under duress. According to Iverson and
colleagues (2012), healthy emotional functioning consists o f emotion regulation, distress
tolerance, and experiential avoidance. In contrast, emotion dysregulation consists of
diminished understanding, responding to, and management o f emotional responses
(Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007). In other words, emotion
regulation has been defined in terms o f the presence of characteristics and the adaptive
degree to which one possesses these characteristics, and emotion dysregulation has been
defined as the absence or diminished presence o f these characteristics.
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The Development of Self-Control
Within a developmental perspective, self-control originates from external
behavioral control imposed by primary caregivers, and is later internalized and external
enforcement is no longer required (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998). Development continues
until a holistic self is established that facilitates goal directed behavior (Heckhausen &
Dweck, 1998). A life-span developmental perspective emphasizes the malleability of
individual characteristics across the life span and situations, similar to McAdams’ (2006)
characteristic adaptations. A life-span developmental perspective helps identify patterns
of behavior that facilitate the formation o f adaptive and dysregulated behavior patterns,
while providing evidence to support the notion that remedial development is possible
(Heckhausen & Dweck, 1998).
Self-maintenance involves accessing the holistic self, stored in extension memory,
whereas goal maintenance involves accessing the established goal, stored in intention
memory (intention and extension memory are discussed above within the context of PSI
theory and State Orientation). Ideally, self-maintenance and goal maintenance occur
simultaneously, that is, the goal is internalized and consistent with the holistic self.
Alternately, an individual can shift between self-maintenance and goal maintenance,
alternating volitional functioning is necessary when the goal is not yet an aspect of the
holistic self, as in when one is anticipating an outcome that is contingent on the goal
being achieved (e.g., finishing graduate school). Self-control is more cognitively
demanding than self-regulation, involving the activation o f the punishment system in
order to suppress maladaptive aspects o f the self until the goal can be integrated into the
holistic self and maintained by self-regulation, a less demanding mode o f volition.
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Some theorists argue emotion regulation involves control over one’s emotional
experience and expression as well as the ability to decrease the intensity o f one’s
emotions. Others argue emotion regulation does not equal emotional control; rather,
emotion regulation is rooted in acceptance and appreciation of one’s emotional
experiences and perceived effectiveness of attempts to alter one’s negative emotional
experience (Schuppert et al., 2009).

Modes of Volition
According to Kuhl and Fuhrmann (1998), there are two modes of volition: selfcontrol and self-regulation. According to PSI theory the self is an integrated and implicit
representation o f a person’s experiences, beliefs, and needs. Self-regulation involves
behaving in a manner consistent with the integrated (holistic) self. The four subsystems
(mentioned above) interact in various ways to influence behavior; a process referred to as
central coordination, the defining characteristic underlying self-control and self
regulation. Central coordination involves various interactions within the subsystems of
the mind. According to PSI theory, the mind consists o f cognitive, emotional,
motivational, and temperamental processes that function simultaneously; however, any
one o f these aspects can modulate behavior. This conceptualization suggests emotion
regulation involves management o f one’s thoughts, emotions, motivations, and
sensations. Management o f one’s thoughts involves the ability to disrupt ruminative
processes, management o f one’s emotions involves the ability to down-regulate negative
affect, management o f one’s motivations involves maintenance o f goal directed behavior,
and management o f one’s sensations involves the ability to decrease the physiological
arousal.
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Adolescents who self-injure employ more avoidant coping strategies including
alcohol abuse and thought suppression, and exert less attention to solutions related to the
presenting problem than their non-injurious peers (Evans, Hawton, Rodham, Psychol, &
Deeks, 2005). Suggesting adolescent self-injurers become distracted by their emotional
experience, thereby hindering their ability to generate relevant problem solving strategies.
These findings are consistent with Kuhl’s (2011) argument that state oriented individuals
have greater difficulty maintaining goal directed behavior (i.e., in this case problem
solving) following arousal o f negative affect.
The tendency to avoid potentially or actually aversive emotional experiences is
associated with emotion dysregulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Much of the emotion
dysregulation literature has its origins in Linehan’s biosocial theory o f Borderline
Personality Disorder. Emotion dysregulation is associated with dysregulated behavior
including self-injury; more precisely, the inability to refrain from dysregulated behavior
is an aspect o f emotion regulation and self-injury is a failure to refrain from dysregulated
behavior. Emotional expressivity is negatively associated with emotion dysregulation,
suggesting emotional expressivity is an aspect of emotion regulation. This argument was
supported by the emotional expressivity factor o f the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation
Scale (DERS), discussed below. Emotion dysregulation is associated with self-injury,
suggesting that emotion regulation involves suppression of impulsive urges to engage in
dysregulated behavior in response to an aversive emotional state. Another aspect of
emotion regulation is the ability to maintain goal directed behavior and sustained mental
effort under duress. According to Gratz and Roemer (2004), emotion regulation involves
acceptance o f one’s emotional experience, in contrast to increased negative emotions in
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response to one’s initial experience. Recognizing an emotional shift and the ability to
label the emotion are aspects o f emotion regulation, referred to as awareness and clarity,
respectively (Gratz & Roemer, 2004).
Problem solving, coping skills, and emotion regulation strategies are reasonably
synonymous with one another such that findings suggesting deficits in any of these
categories supports the argument that one’s ability to manage his or her emotions is an
aspect o f emotion regulation. Inadequate self-relaxation (i.e., State Orientation) is an
aspect o f emotion dysregulation, that is, rumination that interferes with goal directed
behavior and behavioral inhibition (i.e., inhibition of maladaptive coping strategies;
Baumann et al., 2007).
Distress tolerance refers to the actual or perceived ability to withstand negative
emotional states (Gratz et al., 2012; Nock & Mendes, 2008; Tull, Gratz, Latzman,
Kimbrel, & Lejuez, 2010). According to Gratz and Roemer (2004), distress tolerance is
an aspect o f emotion dysregulation. Distress tolerance and the ability to maintain goal
directed behavior when under duress is indicative o f emotion regulation; in contrast,
diminished distress tolerance and an inadequate ability to maintain goal directed behavior
when under duress is indicative o f emotion dysregulation. Inadequate distress tolerance is
associated with emotion dysregulation and experiential avoidance (Gratz et al., 2009;
Iverson et al., 2012).
Similar to distress tolerance and emotion dysregulation, experiential avoidance is
an unwillingness to remain in contact with an aversive internal experience (e.g., thoughts,
emotions, sensations, memories, and urges) by escaping or avoiding the internal
experience (Iverson et al., 2012). Experiential avoidance involves behavior that functions

as avoidance or escape from unwanted emotions, thoughts, or somatic sensations
(Chapman et al., 2006; Selby & Joiner, 2009; Tull, Jakupcak, Paulson, & Gratz, 2007).
These somatic sensations discussed may be associated with anxiety (Tull et al., 2007),
impulsive urgency (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010), or tension that frequently precedes selfinjury (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Klonsky & Olino, 2008; Selby et al., 2012). Experiential
avoidance also involves thought suppression (Tull et al., 2007), alcohol and substance
abuse (Bomovalova, Tull, Gratz, Levy, & Lejuez, 2011), impulsive eating (binging;
Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991), impulsive spending, attempted suicide (Baumeister,
1991), self-injury, dissociation (Armey & Crowther, 2008), and avoidant coping
strategies (Chapman & Dixon-Gordon, 2007; Gratz & Chapman, 2007).
According to Baumeister (1991), people attempt to escape the self to avoid selfdeprecating cognitive processes, to find solace from demands associated with aspects of
the self, or to experience the transcendence associated with being disconnected from the
self. He argues these functions are not mutually exclusive; rather, they possess similar
features and frequently overlap. Baumeister argues people are especially prone to
engaging in escape behaviors following challenges to the self. This argument is
consistent with the contention that stimuli that are discrepant with one’s holistic self
frequently lead to negative affect (Kuhl, 2001). How one manages discrepant or, as
Baumeister (1991) put it, calamitous feedback, may involve escape behavior, especially
when the individual has a limited capacity to down-regulate the negative affect aroused
(e.g., state oriented individuals). According to Iverson and colleagues (2012), experiential
avoidance is a function o f emotion dysregulation and distress tolerance.
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition-Text
Revised (DSM-IV-TR) utilizes a polythetic categorical model that organizes diagnoses
into clinical syndromes, based on endorsement (or presence) o f a minimum number o f
criteria for the given diagnosis. In other words, when the minimum number o f criteria is
present an individual is thought to have exceeded the diagnostic threshold for that
disorder. In addition to a categorical syndrome approach to diagnosing mental disorders,
the DSM-IV-TR utilized a comprehensive multiaxial assessment system to evaluate
individuals across five axes (domains) relative to effective treatment. The five axes in the
DSM-IV-TR multiaxial classification system include: Axis I —Clinical Disorders, Other
conditions that may be the focus of clinical attention; Axis II - Personality Disorders and
Mental Retardation; Axis III - General Medical Conditions; Axis IV - Psychosocial and
Environmental Problems; and Axis V - Global Assessment o f Functioning. When a
diagnostic evaluation is completed, the clinician utilizes client’s reports (either, verbal as
in a diagnostic interview, or written as in self-report rating scales) regarding symptoms
and behaviors present, as well as psychosocial and environmental factors that may affect
treatment, in order to assess Axes I, II, IV, and V. The client’s medical history is obtained
from his/her primary care physician with consent, and diagnoses reported in the client’s
medical history are included on Axis III. Throughout his/her interactions with the client,
the evaluator utilizes clinical judgment to note signs (observable symptoms) associated
with various disorders and incorporates his/her observations into the multiaxial
assessment and subsequent diagnosis (or diagnoses). When available and consent is
obtained, the evaluator utilizes other reporting sources such as family members,
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significant others, court documents, testing results, and archival records to facilitate
accurate evaluation o f the presenting problem.

DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders
Axis I is comprised o f most classifications within the manual except those
classified on Axis II. Unless otherwise specified, Axis I diagnoses are the focus o f
treatment. In the event there is not enough evidence to provide a diagnosis on a given
axis, diagnosis is deferred until additional information is available. Although self-injury
frequently occurs concomitantly with a variety o f Axis I diagnoses, including; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Anxiety Disorders, and Impulsecontrol disorders; self-injury is most frequently associated with the Axis II diagnosis of
Borderline Personality Disorder (Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010).

DSM-IV-TR Axis II Disorders
Axis II is comprised o f the Personality Disorders and Mental Retardation, as well
as prominent maladaptive personality features and defense mechanisms (e.g., borderline
personality features or frequent use of dissociation, respectively; (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Mental Retardation is classified as a Disorder Usually First
Diagnosed in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence, and is further delineated according to
degree o f severity; Mild Mental Retardation - Intelligence Quotient (IQ) level 50-55;
Moderate Mental Retardation - IQ level 35-40 to 50-55; Severe Mental Retardation - IQ
level 20-25 to 35-40; Profound Mental Retardation - IQ level below 20 or 25. Great
behavioral variation within the diagnoses o f Mental Retardation exists; therefore,
behavioral descriptions o f individuals with Mental Retardation are varied. For example,
one individual with Mental Retardation may be passive and dependent, whereas another
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individual may be aggressive and impulsive. Certain general medical conditions
associated with Mental Retardation (e.g., Lesch-Nyhan syndrome) are associated with
stereotypic self-injurious behavior, however, this form of self-injury is distinct from the
non-stereotypic form that is the focus o f this study.
According to DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000),
classification of Mental Retardation and Personality Disorders on Axis II aims to ensure
adequate evaluation o f these two major disorder categories as the signs and symptoms of
these disorders may be overshadowed by the more florid Axis I disorders. In other words,
disorders on Axis II may require more thorough evaluation in order to be detected,
especially when in conjunction with the primary Axis I diagnosis. Although moderate to
profound Mental Retardation would be readily observable within an initial assessment,
Mild Mental Retardation and the personality disorders may go undetected if not fully
examined, thereby hindering successful treatment o f the comorbid Axis I disorder(s).
Likewise, adequate evaluation of the Axis II disorders is intended to distinguish chronic
characterological symptoms from those typically more episodic, as in the Axis I
disorders.

Relevant DSM-5 Changes
In 1999 the D SM revision process began with an evaluation o f the strengths and
weaknesses o f the manual based on contemporary research (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). The evaluation resulted in “A Research Agenda for DSM-V,” which
was a monograph o f the proceedings. Subsequently thirteen diagnostic work groups were
formed and a 5-year process o f reviewing literature, performing secondary analyses,
publishing findings, drafting proposed diagnostic criteria, obtaining public comment,
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presenting preliminary findings associated with the proposed criteria, performing field
trials, and revising accordingly was initiated. The work groups proposed revisions
according to the rationale, scope of changes, potential impact, strength of empirical
support, clarity, and clinical utility (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Draft
revisions were guided by the following principles: feasibility in routine practice,
empirical foundation, continuity over revision, and no a priori limits on the proportion of
changes. Placement in Section III, “Conditions for further study,” was a result of the
amount o f research focusing on the diagnosis, reliability and validity o f the diagnosis,
and benefits associated with continued research.
The Global Assessment o f Functioning (GAF) scale was dropped due to lack of
clarity and inconsistency between raters. The World Health Organization Disability
Assessment Schedule (WHODAS) has been added to the “Assessment Measures” chapter
of Section III, for further study o f its utility as a global measure o f impairment. The
change most relevant to the current study is the elimination o f the multiaxial diagnostic
system. The DSM-5 documents diagnoses according to nonaxial designations, that is,
Axes I, II, and III have been combined and disorders relevant to the individual’s mental
disorder(s) should be listed without axial distinction. According to the DSM-5 (2013),
this change is a holistic interpretation o f symptom presentation consistent with the text of
the DSM-IV-TR (2000), which states “the Multiaxial distinction among Axis I, Axis II,
and Axis III disorders does not imply that there are fundamental differences in their
conceptualization, that mental disorders are unrelated to physical or biological factors or
processes, or that general medical conditions are unrelated to behavioral or psychological
factors or processes” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pg. 29). Although the
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DSM-5 has abandoned the multiaxial classification system, the manual has retained the
personality disorder clusters and diagnostic criteria.

Borderline Personality Disorder
According to the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 2013), a
diagnosis o f Personality Disorder is warranted when individual traits become rigid and
maladaptive causing distress or impairment; present in two or more areas (e.g., cognition,
affectivity, interpersonal functioning, impulse control), as well as across a broad range of
situations and areas o f functioning (e.g., social, occupational, and academic).
Specifically, a Personality Disorder is “an enduring pattern of inner experience and
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations o f the individual’s culture, is
pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over
time, and leads to distress or impairment” (pg. 685). In other words, a clinician first
determines that an individual’s symptom presentation exceeds the diagnostic threshold
for a diagnosis o f Personality Disorder and subsequently diagnoses the specific
personality disorder (or multiple disorders where applicable). The DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) organizes specific personality disorder diagnoses into one
o f three general clusters (i.e., A, B, & C). Cluster A diagnoses are referred to as odd or
eccentric; cluster B diagnoses are referred to as dramatic, emotional, or erratic; and the
cluster C diagnoses are referred to as anxious or fearful.
Given that Borderline Personality Disorder is the only diagnosis that accounts for
the type o f self-injury that is the focus o f this study; an examination of BPD criteria is
warranted. In contrast, stereotypic self-injury may be associated with a variety o f DSMIV-TR diagnoses including Mental Retardation, Pervasive Developmental Disorders, or
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Stereotypic Movement Disorders, however, this study attempts to distinguish the two
types o f self-injury.
Full criteria for BPD are satisfied by the presence of five of nine possible
diagnostic criteria; as a result, two individuals diagnosed with BPD might present with
only a single common criterion. According to the DSM, Borderline Personality Disorder
Diagnostic Criteria include the following:
A. A pervasive pattern o f instability o f interpersonal relationships, self-image, and
affects, and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a
variety o f contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. Note: Do not
include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.
2. A pattern o f unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized
by alternating between extremes o f idealization and devaluation
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self image or
sense o f self
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g.,
spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). Note: Do
not include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating
behavior
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense
episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and
only rarely more than a few days)
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7. Chronic feelings of emptiness
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent
displays o f temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights).
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms
Borderline Personality Disorder is characterized by diminished distress tolerance
and emotional avoidance, aspects of emotion dysregulation (Gratz, Rosenthalet al.,
2009). Specifically, individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder tend to abandon
goal-directed behavior when the behavior induces or is accompanied by emotional
distress and are less willing to initiate a task that they anticipate will induce distress. Selfinjury is one means by which individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder attempt to
ameliorate unavoidable distress (Selby et al., 2012).
Clarity o f emotions, emotion regulation, and private emotional attention (i.e.,
emotional awareness) are negatively associated with Borderline Personality Disorder
symptoms. Similarly, private emotional preoccupation (i.e., rumination) and public
emotional monitoring are positively associated with Borderline Personality Disorder
symptoms (Leible & Snell, 2004). In other words, although they tend to ruminate about
their internal emotional experiences, individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder
tend to lack awareness o f their internal emotional experiences (Selby, Anestis, Bender, &
Joiner, 2009). Additionally, they are reportedly aware o f and concerned about other’s
reactions to their emotional experiences.
These findings are consistent with Linehan’s (1993) biosocial theory of BPD in
which a biological predisposition (i.e., emotional vulnerability) and environmental factors
(e.g., invalidation) interact, leading to the development o f the disorder. Linehan argues
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the resultant emotional avoidance and diminished distress tolerance are directly
associated with engagement in dysregulated behavior, including self-injury. Recent
research suggests avoidance o f abandonment, relationship instability, identity
disturbance, affective instability (lability), feelings o f emptiness, anger, impulsivity, and
paranoia/dissociation are elevated when self-injury is present (Bomovalova et al., 2010).
Other behaviors associated with the tendency to avoid noxious emotional states include
substance abuse, dissociative behaviors, and disordered eating (Chapman, Specht, &
Cellucci, 2005). Borderline Personality Disorder symptom severity is positively
associated with temperamental vulnerabilities including emotional instability,
impulsivity, and interpersonal instability (Bomovalova et al., 2010). Borderline
Personality Disorder symptom severity is also associated with higher rates o f cocaine and
alcohol dependence as well as anxiety and mood disorders. Although these findings
support the underlying influence o f emotion dysregulation (i.e., emotional avoidance and
diminished distress tolerance) in the development o f Borderline Personality Disorder, that
is not to say emotion dysregulation does not play a central role in the development of
other psychological disorders or phenomena. Distress tolerance has been found to
mediate the relationship between emotional arousal (i.e., emotional cascades) and
behavioral dysregulation (Selby & Joiner, 2009), suggesting that distress tolerance may
play a significant role in the engagement in dysregulated behavior.
Borderline Personality Disorder is associated with poor social problem solving
and emotion regulation difficulties (Dixon-Gordon, Chapman, Lovasz, & Walters, 2011).
Specifically, greater Borderline Personality Disorder symptom severity is associated with
fewer relevant solutions to hypothetical social problems and a greater number of

inappropriate solutions when emotionally distressed. Negative outcomes associated with
BPD features in a nonclinical sample o f young adults (i.e., undergraduate college
students) included diminished academic achievement, greater number of semesters on
academic probation, and social problems (Bagge et al., 2004). According to DixonGordon and colleagues (2011), induced negative emotions mediated the relationship
between Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms and decreased relevant social
problem solving solutions generated. These findings suggest a negative affective state
may temporarily impair one’s ability to access effective problem solving skills and if this
state persists, as with state orientated individuals, dysregulated behavior may follow.
Based on DSM-IV-TR criteria, Bomovalova and colleagues (2010) argue selfinjury and avoidance of abandonment distinguish a high symptom severity Borderline
Personality Disorder group from three less severe groups, supporting a dimensional
conceptualization o f Borderline Personality Disorder in which self-injury is indicative of
a more severe “type” o f Borderline Personality Disorder. Similarly, Chapman and others
(2005) found greater Borderline Personality Disorder symptom severity is associated with
higher self-injury frequency and greater experiential avoidance.
Some researchers argue women with Borderline Personality Disorder are likely to
engage in a variety o f self-injurious behaviors (Sansone, Wiederman, Sansone, &
Monteith, 2000). Overdosing and self-hitting are significantly more likely to be endorsed
by women with Borderline Personality Disorder in a psychiatric sample than those in a
primary care sample. Women with BPD in the primary care sample were more likely to
endorse abusing laxatives than their psychiatric sample counterparts. Although these
differences were observed, women with BPD in both samples were likely to engage in a
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variety o f intrapersonal self-injurious behaviors including cutting, scratching, and selfhitting or head banging. Interestingly, several o f the self-injurious behaviors endorsed by
women in the two samples included a variety of interpersonally oriented behaviors
(Sansone et al., 2000) not currently considered aspects o f NSSI per Section III o f the
DSM-5, but suggestive o f the interpersonal problems associated with BPD per Section III
o f the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The behaviors most frequently
endorsed among women with BPD in the psychiatric sample included self-defeating
thoughts (89%), engagement in emotionally abusive relationships (82%), promiscuity
(67%), alcohol abuse (63%), hitting self (52%), and reckless driving (52%). It is
important to note that a single occurrence o f the behaviors assessed contributed to the
likelihood o f being diagnosed with BPD. These findings suggest there are two distinct
types o f dysregulated behavior (i.e., intrapersonal and interpersonal). Furthermore,
interpersonal behavioral dysregulation may be more indicative o f BPD than intrapersonal
behavioral dysregulation, which may be indicative of either BPD or poor emotion
regulation that leads to impulsive urgency (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010) and subsequent
behavioral dysregulation.

Comorbidity
Borderline Personality Disorder has high rates o f comorbidity with anorexia
nervosa including the restricting (24%), purging (26%), and binging-purging (32%) types
as well as those with a mixed presentation (18%) suggesting an association between the
two disorders and at least one other risk factor (Selby et al., 2010). Individuals with
Anorexia Nervosa and Borderline Personality Disorder were more likely to report alcohol
and substance abuse, self-injury, hitting someone or breaking things, greater incidents of
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fighting/arguing, overdosing, binge-eating, and impulsive spending. In addition to an
increased likelihood o f engaging in the above-mentioned dysregulated behaviors, BPD
symptoms were also associated with risky sexual behavior, and shoplifting/stealing. The
goal o f this study was refinement o f dysregulated behaviors associated with BPD within a
sample o f individuals with anorexia nervosa, however, all dysregulated behaviors
examined were associated with BPD. These findings suggest behavioral dysregulation is
a core feature o f BPD. Furthermore, the specific behavior may be less important than the
phenomena o f behavioral dysregulation itself. This argument was supported by recent
research suggesting NSSI is a feature o f BPD in some cases and a unique disorder in
others (Selby et al., 2012).
Selby and Joiner (2009) extend Linehan’s (1993) biosocial theory o f BPD with
the emotional cascade model o f BPD emergence. Selby and Joiner’s (2009) model
includes emotional cascades and expectancy validation (i.e., reinforcement of negative
cognitions about oneself following dysregulated behavior). “Emotional cascades are
vicious cycles o f intense rumination and negative affect that may induce aversive
emotional states (Selby et al., 2009, pg. 375). The emotional cascade model describes
hypervigilance as a key feature o f BPD that results from childhood abuse, invalidation,
cognitive distortions, and biological vulnerabilities (Selby & Joiner, 2009). The
emotional cascade model describes these influences as distal factors that lead to the
activation o f an aversive cognitive, affective cycle (i.e., an emotional cascade), which
subsequently leads to behavioral dysregulation, low distress tolerance, and the emergence
o f BPD. According to the concept o f expectancy validation, engagement in dysregulated
behavior leads to invalidation and criticism from significant others, which in turn leads to
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activation o f the cognitive, affective cycle (i.e., an emotional cascade) and further
development o f the disorder. In other words, engaging in behaviors that result in
invalidation restarts the sequence of events leading to the emergence o f the disorder, and
reinforces the cycle described in the emotional cascade model.
Emotional cascades occur when an activating event triggers rumination, which in
turn negatively impacts behavior regulation (Selby & Joiner, 2009). In other words, once
the aversive cognitive, affective cycle (i.e., an intense ruminative process) is activated the
result is an emotional cascade leading to behavioral dysregulation. Within the emotional
cascades model, behavioral dysregulation is a negatively reinforced form o f escape from
the aversive cognitive, affective cycle (i.e., the ruminative process). Thought suppression
and low distress tolerance contributes to this process. Emotional cascades, low distress
tolerance, suicidal behavior, behavioral dysregulation, and expectancy validation are
proximal factors leading to the emergence o f BPD.
According to the emotional cascades model, rumination is the link between
behavioral dysregulation and BPD symptoms (Selby et al., 2009). In a recent study
emotional cascades fully mediated the relationship between BPD symptoms and
behavioral dysregulation (including NSSI). NSSI is frequently employed to manage
emotion dysregulation because it is “potent” enough to disrupt the emotional cascade.
Selby et al., (2009) further argue rumination is the driving force behind dysregulated
behavior, suggesting that accounting for ruminative processes and emotion dysregulation
(i.e., impaired functioning under duress) in the engagement of the dysregulated behavior
(including NSSI) fully mediate the relationship between NSSI and BPD. Given that affect
regulation is the primary function for NSSI (Klonsky, 2007), this contention seems
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reasonable. Intense focusing on aversive cognitive and emotional experiences (i.e.,
brooding) is one aspect o f rumination thought to lead to dysregulated behavior. This
argument suggests a measure assessing a construct similar to brooding (i.e., State
Orientation) should at least partially mediate the relationship between dysregulated
behavior (including NSSI) and other phenomena affect by brooding (BPD).
The emotional cascade model proposed by Selby and colleagues (2009) provided
an excellent fit to the data; we anticipated that the current study’s model would have a
less than perfect fit to the data, because over-identified models exhibit less than perfect fit
to the data, in contrast to just-identified models which are expected to perfectly fit the
data as there are zero degrees of freedom in the %2 test. Although the direct path between
BPD and behavioral dysregulation was fully mediated, the indirect effect of BPD on
behavioral dysregulation remained, suggesting BPD leads to emotional cascades, which
lead to behavioral dysregulation.

Nonsuicidal Self-Injury
As a result o f increased prevalence in the United States, self-injury has gained
attention in recent years although the occurrence o f self-injury has existed for centuries
across cultures (Favazza, 1998). Self-injury is startlingly prevalent among adolescents,
leading to increased attention as a cultural phenomenon (Klonsky, Muehlenkamp, Lewis,
& Walsh, 2011). The current definition o f self-injury has evolved due to concerns related
to stigma, incomplete or inadequate description o f the behavior, confusion with
unintentional and stereotypic self-injury, and confusion with suicidal behavior (Gratz,
2001; Nock & Favazza, 2009). Diagnostic criteria for Nonsuicidal Self-injury, per section
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II o f the DSM, distinguish the behavior from attempted suicide and provide a functional
framework for the behavior.
Favazza operationally defined self-mutilation as “the deliberate, direct destruction
or alteration o f body tissue without conscious suicidal intent” (1996, pg. 225). Gratz
(2001) adopted this definition to refer to Deliberate Self-Harm in an effort to reduce the
stigma associated with the term self-mutilation. Favazza (1996) further classified selfmutilation according to degree o f tissue damage, rate o f the behavior, and pattern o f the
behavior. Favazza’s classification system resulted in three categories of self-mutilation:
major, stereotypic, and moderate/superficial.
Major self-mutilation involves extensive tissue damage, occurs infrequently, and
includes behaviors such as eye enucleation, autocastration, and limb amputation
(Favazza, 1998). Major self-mutilation is typically present with psychosis and frequently
accompanied by delusional explanations. Themes associated with major self-mutilation
include: religious and/or sexual atonement, spiritual purification, punishment for sins,
identification with Christ, other biblical references (e.g., “tear out an offending eye” or
“cutting off an offending hand”), becoming a eunuch for heaven’s sake, demonic
influences, heavenly commands or visions, desire to be female (e.g., as in Gender Identity
Disorder), fear o f homosexuality, control o f hypersexuality, and repudiation of
troublesome genitals.
Stereotypic self-mutilation is typically rhythmic, does not involve an implement,
and is associated with Axis I disorders such as Mental Retardation, Stereotypic
Movement Disorder, Autism, and Asperger Syndrome (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Moderate/superficial self-mutilation is compulsive, episodic,
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repetitive, or a combination o f these three subtypes (Favazza, 1996).
Moderate/superficial, episodic or repetitive self-injury consisting of self-injurious
behavior that is low in lethality, resulting in minor tissue damage. Favazza argued that
moderate/superficial, episodic or repetitive self-injury frequently requires the use o f an
implement, contains ritualistic and symbolic components, and usually occurs in solitude.
The argument for symbolic aspects o f NSSI is supported by the findings that the carving
o f words or symbols is a commonly reported behavior among self-injurers (48%;
Klonsky & Olino, 2008). Although historically, moderate/superficial self-injury has
occurred in isolation, recent research indicates peer involvement with self-injury is quite
common among adolescents (82%; Nock & Prinstein, 2005). Compulsive self-mutilation
is better categorized as an impulse control disorder as may be seen in Trichotillomania or
compulsive hand washing associated with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; in other
words, the function o f the behavior is distinctly different than that associated with
moderate/superficial self-mutilation, associated with Nonsuicidal Self-injury.
Previous terminology defining self-injurious behavior was inconsistently utilized,
leading to prevalence rates ranging from 4 to 47%, at least in part, due to varied
definitions o f the behavior. Distinguishing self-injury from a suicide attempt has been
essential to determining the prevalence o f the behavior. As a result, Nock and Favazza
(2009) advocate for the consistent use of the term Nonsuicidal Self-injury among
researchers and clinicians. Factors that have influenced this evolution include
distinguishing NSSI from stereotypic self-injury (associated with a variety of DSM-IV-TR
diagnoses identified above) and suicidal behavior and/or gestures (Nock & Favazza,
2009). Recent research suggests individual assessment o f the methods, functions, and
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context in which NSSI occurs is clinically relevant to the development of effective
treatment planning (Klonsky et al., 2011; Nock & Prinstein, 2004).

Rates of Self-Injury
Observed rates o f self-injury have varied across studies from 4%- 47% (Gratz,
2001; Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Lloyd-Richardson, Perrine, Dierker, &
Kelley, 2007; Ross & Heath, 2002; Whitlock, Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006). Ross and
Heath (2002) observed 13.9% of high school students reported at least one incident o f
self-injury prior to participation in the study. According to Lloyd-Richardson and others
(2007), exclusive o f attempted suicide, wound picking, and "other" (i.e., unspecified)
methods o f self-injury, 46.5% of adolescents in a community sample endorsed having
engaged in self-injurious behavior in the previous year.
There is a relative dearth o f research examining self-injury in children; as a result,
limited data regarding childhood rates o f self-injury are available. Based on retrospective
reports from adolescents, young adults (Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004), and college
students (Whitlock et al., 2006) estimated rates o f childhood self-injury (i.e., childhood
onset) are approximately 5%. The average age o f onset for NSSI is approximately 13
years. The average age o f termination for the behavior is less clear as in some cases the
behavior continues into adulthood, non-clinical adult samples range from 4 - 6% and an
estimated 11% or more in clinical samples (Klonsky et al., 2011).

Methods of Self-Injury
Self-cutting is the most common method of NSSI (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010),
followed by self-hitting, pinching, scratching, and biting (Ross & Heath, 2002). Cutting
is often the first method with which individuals experiment (Todd & Abwender, 2012).
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O f adolescents who reported self-injuring, 42% reported only one method, 52% reported
two to five methods, and 6% reported greater than six methods (Lloyd-Richardson et al.,
2007). According to Glenn and Klonsky (2010), the vast majority (96%) o f self-injurers
engage in more than one method and a substantial proportion (81%) reported three or
more methods. Severity o f self-injury increases as the number of methods employed
increases (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009). The risk of a suicide attempt by a self-injurer
increases as the number o f methods and incidents o f self-injury increases (Brunner et al.
2007; Klonsky & Olino 2008; Lloyd-Richardson 2007; Nock et al. 2006; Zlotnick et al.
1997). According to Robertson and others (2012), the number self-injurious methods
employed is positively associated with Openness to Experience, Sensitivity to
Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward, and negatively associated with Contentiousness.
These findings suggest number of different self-injurious methods is indicative of
increased severity (Brunner et al., 2007; Gratz, 2001; Klonsky & Olino, 2008; LloydRichardson et al., 2007; Nock, Holmberg, Photos, & Michel, 2007; Robertson, Miskey,
Mitchell & Nelson-Gray, 2012).

Functions of Self-Injury
In addition to the growing body of literature identifying risk factors and clinical
concomitants o f NSSI, a functional framework has emerged (Klonsky & Olino, 2008;
Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). The vast majority (80%) o f self-injures report automatic
negative reinforcement (i.e., the amelioration of negative emotions or cognitions) as the
primary motivation for engagement in the behavior. Automatic Negative Reinforcement
(ANR) is a well-documented motivation for engaging in self-injury (Nock, 2009). Given
the frequency at which self-injurers report ANR for engagement in the behavior, it’s

likely that self-injurers are more frequently motivated to escape a noxious affective
experience than non-injurers. Automatic negative and automatic positive reinforcement
are significantly positively correlated with one another, however these correlations are
sufficiently low that the two constructs should be considered different aspects of
automatic reinforcement (Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005; Robertson et al., 2012).
Adolescent self-injurers reported intrapersonal - negative reinforcement approximately
two thirds (64.7%) o f the time, intrapersonal - positive reinforcement approximately one
quarter (24.5%) o f the time, interpersonal - negative reinforcement approximately 15%
o f the time, and least often, interpersonal - positive reinforcement approximately four
percent o f the time. Ninety-three percent o f self-injurers reported thoughts about
engaging in NSSI five times per week, on average; and 86% reported having engaged in
NSSI at least once per week (1.6 times). In one study, 22-28% o f self-injurious
adolescents endorsed intrapersonal, automatic reinforcers for the behavior, and 19-31 %
reported social reinforcers for the behavior (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007) with an
average o f 4.76 reinforcers. Minor self-injurious behaviors were only associated with
intrapersonal, automatic negative reinforcement (e.g., ameliorate negative affect, whereas
moderate self-injurious behaviors were highly correlated with all four examined
functions. Self-injurers with a history of attempted suicide reported a greater number of
prior psychiatric hospitalizations, a greater extent of previous outpatient psychiatric
treatment, and current suicidal ideation. These findings suggest that more severe selfinjury is associated with an increased number o f motivations and likely an increased
frequency as well.
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Interestingly the most severe group had the highest rates o f cutting and also
reported the highest degree o f automatic reinforcement. Clearly, the functional model of
self-injury offers a clinically relevant framework within which motivational intent can be
examined (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005).

Contextual Features of Self-Injury
According to Ross and Heath (2002), Caucasian students represented the largest
proportion o f self-injurers regardless o f socioeconomic status and the ethnic composition
o f the school they attended. Similarly, according to Lloyd-Richardson and colleagues
(2007), African American participants were less likely than their Caucasians counterparts
to report engaging in self-injurious behavior in general and less likely to endorse
moderate forms o f self-injury (i.e., African American participants reported more mild
forms o f self-injury). These results remained constant across urban and suburban
academic settings.
In one study, girls reported significantly higher rates o f self-injury than boys, 64%
and 36%, respectively (Heath, Ross, Toste, Charlebois & Nedecheva, 2009), however,
other studies have revealed no significant gender differences (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010).
Melvin and colleagues (2012) found females were more likely than males to report
intrapersonal functions for their self-injurious behavior, albeit not significantly.
Cutting oneself has a very low lethality, accounting for less than 0.5% of suicides
committed by individuals under the age o f 24, and only 0.6% of suicides committed by
individuals o f all ages. Nonsuicidal self-injurers report higher levels of self-esteem and
less interpersonal conflict with their parents than their suicidal counterparts (Brausch &
Gutierrez, 2010; Evans et al., 2005; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004). Nock and

43
Favazza (2009) advocate for consistent use o f the term Nonsuicidal Self-injury in place
o f previously utilized terms in order to establish a common language between researchers
and clinicians.
According to Glenn and Klonsky (2010), self-injurers were significantly younger
as a group than their non-injuring counterparts, and the self-injuring group had
significantly more members endorsing full diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive
Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Alcohol Abuse; likewise Ross and Heath
(2002) indicated depression and anxiety were associated with self-injury. These findings
suggest self-injury is associated with a variety o f concomitants not just Borderline
Personality Disorder.
In a study o f undergraduate college students, subjective pain experience predicted
bruising behaviors, burning behaviors, and the use of multiple methods of NSSI (Todd &
Abwender, 2012), however, subjective pain experience did not predict NSSI in general or
cutting specifically. Interestingly, Ross and Heath (2002) revealed a qualitative
distinction between hitting oneself and hitting an external object (e.g., hitting a wall) in
interviews with adolescents; that is, when they reported hitting an object it was most
frequently precipitated by anger toward others, whereas when they reported hitting
oneself it was most frequently precipitated by anger (or other self-directed emotions; e.g.,
self-hatred or a desire to punish oneself) toward oneself. These results suggest selfdeprecation may be a primary function of NSSI, at least for some self-injurers. It is
unclear whether there were gender differences regarding anger and/or other provocative
emotions. Although adolescents who self-injure are at a greater risk for suicidal thoughts
and suicide attempts (Nock et al., 2006; Prinstein et al., 2008), the distinction between
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Nonsuicidal Self-injury and self-injury involving suicidal intent is essential to the
consistent evaluation o f the target behavior (i.e., Nonsuicidal Self-injury).

Risk Factors for Self-injury
Risk factors for self-injury include emotion dysregulation, diminished coping
strategies, poor self-regulation, poor interpersonal communication, self-criticism, self
derogation, alexithymia, and in adolescents, the presence of peer involvement in the
behavior (Davis, 2012; Gratz et al., 2006; Klonsky et al., 2011; Klonsky & Olino, 2008;
Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). According to Miskey, Hill, and Huelsman (2012),
perfectionism, rumination, organization (i.e., the tendency to be neat, orderly, and
disciplined), and concern over mistakes (inversely) significantly predict the frequency of
self-injury. Interestingly, extraversion predicted cutting frequency, whereas introversion
predicted duration o f cutting. Individuals who engage in self-injurious behavior have
significantly greater negative affect than individuals who do not engage in the behavior
(Davis, 2012; Nock & Prinstein, 2004 & 2005; Linehan, 1993) as well as significantly
greater affective lability (Bomovalova et al, 2010; Linehan, 1993).

Borderline Personality Disorder
Dubo, Zanarini, Lewis, and Williams (1997) observed an association between
Borderline Personality Disorder and self-destructive behavior, including self-injury.
Linehan (1993) identified higher levels of negative affect (i.e., depressed mood),
suppressed anger (i.e., inhibited anger), and overcontrol as characteristic of typical selfinjuring borderlines. Linehan (1993) describes chronic self-injuring borderline
individuals, as less likely than their non-injurious counterparts to outwardly display
anger; rather, they tend to engage in passive and submissive interpersonal interactions
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(Linehan, 1993). Self-injury (i.e., self-mutilation) and Borderline Personality Disorder are
both associated with childhood trauma including sexual abuse, physical abuse, and
neglect (Dubo et al., 1997). A similar relationship between neglect (e.g., a caregiver’s
failure to protect and/or provide consistent need satisfaction) and chronic self-injurious
behavior was also noted. Interestingly, neglect moderated/mediated the association
between sexual abuse and self-injury. Finally, they argue that a lack o f emotional
responsiveness and lack o f protection from caregivers’ plays a role in the development of
emotion dysregulation, a characteristic associated with Borderline Personality Disorder
and self-injury (Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2009).
According to Selby and colleagues (2009), rumination about aversive events is a
risk factor for engagement in self-injury. Najmi and others (2007) suggest self-injury may
function as a means o f distracting oneself from aversive thoughts (i.e., aversive
rumination) in addition to aversive affective states. These findings support those observed
in the aversive self-awareness findings o f Armey and Crowther (2008).
Research suggests self-injurers are a heterogeneous group often exhibiting full
diagnostic criteria for a variety of mental health diagnoses including Major Depressive
Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Alcohol Abuse (Klonsky & Olino, 2008).
Similarly, Glenn and Klonsky (2010) identified greater concomitance with depression,
anxiety, and alcohol abuse, among self-injurers than non-self-injurers. Furthermore, Axis
I symptoms mediated differences in Sensation Seeking between self-injurers and nonself-injurers, however, Impulsive Urgency and Premeditation were not mediated by Axis
I symptoms. According to Jeter and colleauges (2012), self-injurers report higher rates of
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abuse, experiential avoidance, depression, and anxiety, however, experiential avoidance
partially mediated the relationship between Nonsuicidal Self-injury and abuse history.
Glenn and Klonsky (2010) identified Impulsive Urgency (i.e., a tendency to
engage in impulsive behaviors in response to a negative state) as the trait most
characteristic o f self-injurers, followed by decreased Premeditation (i.e., the ability to
postpone action in order to consider potential outcomes), and increased Sensation
Seeking (i.e., a propensity for seeking excitement and adventure). Decreased levels of
Premeditation observed by Glenn and Klonsky (2010) corroborate earlier research
(Evans, Hawton, Rodham, Psychol, & Deeks, 2005) suggesting individuals who engage
in NSSI suffer from inadequate self-regulation (behavioral inhibition, planning, and
executive functioning). Additionally, adolescent self-injurers were more likely than their
non-injurious counterparts to seek help from their peers than other sources (Evans,
Hawton, Rodham, Psychol, & Deeks 2005; Evans et al., 2005). Perseverance (i.e., the
ability to follow a task to completion) was not significantly different between injurers and
non-injurers, however, individuals who self-injure and exhibit low Perseverance, engage
in more frequent self-injury than their high Perseverance counterparts. Likewise,
impulsivity was significantly associated with number of self-injurious methods (Lynam,
Miller, Miller, Bomovalova, & Lejuez, 2011). However, this may in fact be a form of
state impulsivity (i.e., impulsive urgency) rather than trait impulsivity. Impulsive urgency
is an aversive affective state that may elicit a burgeoning desire to escape or eliminate the
experienced state (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010). Suggesting, affective tension increases
following an activating event and continues until the individual engages in self-injury, or
in some cases, once the individual decides to self-injure.

Gratz (2008) revealed that the relationship between dysregulated behavior
(including self-injury) and childhood maltreatment is mediated by emotion dysregulation,
suggesting that childhood maltreatment leads to emotion dysregulation resulting in an
increased risk o f dysregulated behavior later in life. Recent research suggests the
influence o f childhood maltreatment on intimate partner abuse is also mediated by
emotion dysregulation (Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Gratz, Paulson, Jakupack & Tull,
2009). Specifically, men who had experienced childhood maltreatment yet had developed
emotion regulation strategies had fewer incidents o f intimate partner violence than their
emotionally dysregulated counterparts. These finding suggest intimate partner abuse may
function as a behavioral emotion regulation mechanism for males who experienced
childhood maltreatment and have not developed emotion regulation skills.
In one study, adolescents at risk for suicide with a history o f self-injury were
more likely to meet criteria for an eating disorder and to report higher levels of anxiety,
depression, and negative affect (Melvin et al., 2012). Suicidal thoughts rarely occur
simultaneously with thoughts of NSSI, however, thoughts o f substance use and
binging/purging occurred simultaneously with thoughts of NSSI rather frequently (i.e.,
15-20% o f the time; Nock, Prinstein, & Sterba, 2009). Furthermore frequency o f selfinjury is positively predicted by intensity of thoughts about the behavior and negatively
predicted by duration o f thoughts about the behavior. Although a shorter duration of selfinjurious thoughts may be an artifact of actual engagement in the behavior resulting in the
cessation o f the thoughts. Social problems are associated with interpersonal functions of
nonsuicidal self-injury (Hilt, Cha, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008; Nock & Mendes, 2008),
whereas greater sensitivity to stress and a history o f escape behavior (e.g., suicide
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attempts) predict intrapersonal functions o f nonsuicidal self-injury (Nock & Mendes,
2008; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005).

Theories Explaining Self-Injury
Self-injury has been documented as a method o f altering one’s affective state
rather than an effort to terminate one’s life (Franklin et al., 2010; Gratz, 2001, 2003;
Klonsky, 2007; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005; Ross & Heath, 2002; Selby et al., 2012;
Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010). Recent research comparing Nonsuicidal Self-injury to
attempted overdose in youth (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; Evans, Hawton, & Rodham,
2005; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004) consistently reveals significantly less suicidal
ideation in the self-injuring group. The vast majority (87%) o f cutting (or puncturing)
incidents evaluated at emergency departments lack suicidal intent. A substantial
proportion o f adolescents (88%) who cut, report the incident is inaccurately deemed a
suicide attempt. In spite o f these findings, 10-30% o f individuals who present at
emergency departments having cut or pierced their skin are admitted as inpatients
(Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010).
Smith, Cox, and Saradjian (1999) proposed moderate/superficial repetitive and/or
episodic self-injury is associated with a neurochemical rush. Specifically, the release of
endogenous neurotransmitters (i.e., opioids and serotonin) in response to physical trauma
leads to subsequent feelings o f calm or euphoria. They argue tolerance develops and
more extreme self-injury is necessary to elicit the same euphoric experience.
Several emotion focused theories have been used to explain self-injury including
but not limited to: the affect regulation model, dissociation model, experiential avoidance
model, emotional cascade model, thought suppression model, and the integrated model.
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According to Davis (2012), a protective pathway composed of improved affect
regulation, increased positive affect, decreased negative affect, and increased self
regulation can prevent the occurrence of the behavior. In other words, the development of
these skills moderates the association between an activating event and engagement in
self-injury.
According to Selby and Joiner’s (2009), Emotional Cascade Model, nonsuicidal
self-injury is one o f many dysregulated behaviors present in individuals diagnosed with
Borderline Personality Disorder, per DSM-IV-TR criteria. The sequence o f emotional
stimulus followed by ruminative processes (i.e., positive feedback loops) intensifies the
aversive affective state leading to behavioral dysregulation (e.g., NSSI). This series o f
events is what Selby and Joiner refer to as an emotional cascade. Similarly, dissociation
is a cognitive method o f escaping negative affective states that may be associated with
greater affect sensitivity. Furthermore, they argue a reciprocal relationship between
rumination and thought suppression exists. They further contend that the distracting,
dysregulated behaviors including: reckless driving, impulsive spending, shop lifting,
pathological gambling; and o f course self-injury need be adequately stimulating to
disrupt the ruminative thoughts fueling the affective, cognitive cycle. According to Selby
and Joiner, rumination on negative affect leads to increased emotional intensity, and
subsequently more rumination in a circular manner.
According to the Experiential Avoidance Theory, initially proposed by Marsha
Linehan (1993), as it applies to self-injury within the context o f BPD; more recently
elaborated by Chapman, Gratz, and Brown (2006) and supported by Armey and Crowther
(2008), self-injury is a means of avoiding unwanted or aversive experiences. They further

contend that self-injury regulates intense emotions and increases distress tolerance as its
primary mechanism (Chapman et al., 2006). According to Gratz, Rosenthal, and others
2009), self-injurers are less willing to experience distress in order to complete a task than
their non-injurious counterparts, however, their performance on the task is not
significantly different. Interestingly, self-injurers did not report significantly greater
distress, in spite o f their decreased willingness to experience a negative affective state.
Suggesting a low threshold for distress tolerance rather than greater subjective distress.
Based on experiential avoidance theory, Turner, Layden, and Chapman (2012)
examined the role o f experiential avoidance in the prediction of NSSI over the course of
six months. Experiential avoidance predicted future engagement in self-injury and the
number o f methods endorsed above and beyond that accounted for by other risk factors
(i.e., emotion dysregulation, affect intensity and reactivity, and distress tolerance; Turner
et al., 2012). According to Turner and colleagues (2012), experiential avoidance fully
mediates the association between emotion dysregulation and frequency of self-injurious
behavior. Given that Turner and others (2012) found experiential avoidance fully
mediated the association between emotion dysregulation and frequency of self-injurious
behavior, State Orientation may be associated with overall incidents o f nonsuicidal selfinjury as well as Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms and emotion dysregulation.
In addition to support for the experiential avoidance model, Armey and Crowther’s
(2008) research supports the previously observed association between self-injury and
dissociation (Klonsky, 2007), however, the variance accounted for by dissociation is
relatively small after controlling for aversive self-awareness.
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Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory is a biologically based theory (Corr, 2004).
Sensitivity to Punishment adds a unique contribution to the prediction o f number o f NSSI
methods (Robertson et al., 2012). Severity of NSSI increases as the number o f methods
employed increases (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009) and the number o f self-injurious methods
employed is positively associated with Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to
Reward (Robertson et al., 2012).
Self-injurers report more subjective distress than was observed via a physiological
measure (i.e., their subjective experience o f distress was greater than physiological
indicators o f distress; Franklin et al., 2010; Glenn et al., 2011); suggesting an individual’s
cognitive appraisal o f distress predicts self-injury, although physiological responses may
not significantly predict self-injury. These results suggest cognitive appraisals leading to
emotional distress may be essential components o f affect sensitivity.
Nonsuicidal Self-injury (NSSI) is the “direct, deliberate destruction o f one’s own
body tissue in the absence of suicidal intent” (Nock & Favazza, 2009, pg. 9). This
definition eliminates acts o f self-injury that do not result in direct (primary) self-injury
(e.g., taking an overdose) and narrows the scope o f behaviors to those that result in direct
bodily injury (e.g., cutting or burning one’s own skin). Although the severity of the
damage that results from the self-injurious act may vary substantially, essential to this
definition o f NSSI is that the injury is a result of the individual’s own actions rather than
a delayed process resulting from the act (e.g., an overdose after having consumed an
exorbitant amount o f a substance). In addition to the necessary components o f NSSI per
this definition, the injury must occur outside any culturally sanctioned form of selfinflicted injury (see Favazza, 1996). NSSI as defined by Nock and Favazza (2009) is the
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foundation o f the DSM-5 disorder warranting further investigation, and the form of NSSI
that is the focus o f this study.

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders —
Fifth Edition (DSM-5)
According to the Guidelines fo r Making Changes to the DSM -V (Kendler, Kupfer,
Narrow, Phillips, & Fawcett, 2009), a change to the manual needs to be initiated by a
reason for the change that is adequately supported by relevant literature. Specifically, the
Guidelines argue the magnitude o f evidence in support o f a change should be
proportional to the magnitude o f the change. The addition of a new diagnosis is
considered a major change, requiring substantial empirical support; this description is
especially true o f a pattern o f behavior previously accounted for by another diagnosis.
Specifically, the Guidelines argue that significant changes to the manual require
empirical support o f high-priority validators including: antecedents, heritability,
predictive, diagnostic stability, course, and response to treatment studies. In order for
major changes to be made to the manual, the change needs to be consistently supported
across validators and methodological approaches, with little contradictory evidence.
Diagnostic validators and clinical utility should aid in the distinction between two similar
diagnoses, with the benefits o f differential diagnosis always exceeding the potential
harm.
For a new diagnosis to be included in the manual, careful examination o f the
relationship between the new diagnosis and established diagnoses that account for the
behavior as well as the consequences o f the addition (e.g., potential harm and available
treatments) must be conducted and support the addition (Kendler et al., 2009). The

behavior or symptoms should be indicative o f a diagnosis, not merely a variation of
normal psychological functioning. Features of a diagnosis are defined as: a pattern of
behavior that leads to distress or impairment and exceeds culturally sanctioned responses
to the precipitating event. The behavior pattern reflects an underlying disturbance not
better accounted for by social deviance. Finally, the diagnosis should facilitate improved
clinical conceptualization and treatment planning.
Additionally, the Guidelines suggest diagnoses in the appendix be reviewed for
deletion, promotion, or retention (Kendler et al., 2009). Reasons a diagnosis would be
deleted from the DSM-5 appendix include inadequate empirical support (e.g., too few
studies or studies with low reliability) and inadequate differentiation from an existing
category or diagnosis. The diagnosis should be promoted if guidelines for addition to the
manual are met. Finally, retention in the DSM-5 appendix would be a result of increased
empirical support for the diagnosis, overlap with other diagnoses, potential maleficence,
or an unclear need for the addition. Retention (or entry) into the appendix (i.e., section
III) o f DSM-5 suggests empirical evidence adequately supports further examination and
potential promotion to the main manual in a future edition. The reliability validator for a
new diagnosis may be a roadblock to inclusion for Nonsuicidal Self-injury in future
manuals given the developmental trajectory o f the behavior (i.e., the observed decline in
incidents into early and middle adulthood, with most self-injurers stopping the behavior
by their mid-twenties; Klonsky et al., 2011). These findings suggest self-injury may
function as a means o f managing one’s internal affective experience prior to the
development o f the prefrontal cortex in adolescents; furthermore, self-injury may be
indicative o f inadequately developed affect regulation in adults.

54
Although incidents of NSSI, per Section III o f the DSM-5, exclude behaviors
involving suicidal intent many who self-injure will attempt suicide at some point (Shaffer
& Jacobson, 2010). The likelihood that an individual who engages in Nonsuicidal Selfinjury will attempt suicide is greater in clinical populations, those who employ multiple
methods, and those who report more incidents of self-injury (Brunner et al., 2007;
Cloutier, Martin, Kennedy, Nixon, & Muehlenkamp, 2010; Nock & Banaji, 2007;
Zlotnick et al., 1997).

DSM-5 NSSI Criteria
The diagnostic criteria for NSSI per DSM-5 are listed below.
1. In the last year, the individual has, on 5 or more days, engaged in intentional selfinflicted damage to the surface of his or her body, o f a sort likely to induce
bleeding, bruising or pain (e.g., cutting, burning, stabbing, hitting, excessive
rubbing), with the expectation that the injury will lead to only minor or moderate
physical harm (i.e., there is no suicidal intent). Note: The absence o f suicidal
intent has either been stated by the individual or can be inferred by the
individual’s repeated engagement in a behavior that the individual knows, or has
learned, is not likely to result in death.
2. The individual engages in the self-injurious behavior with one or more of the
following expectation:
1. To obtain relief from a negative feeling or cognitive state.
2. To resolve an interpersonal difficulty.
3. To induce a positive feeling state.

Note: The desired relief or response is experienced during or shortly after the
self-injury, and the individual may display patterns of behavior suggesting a
dependence on repeatedly engaging in it.
The intentional self-injury is associated with at least one o f the following:
1. Interpersonal difficulties or negative feelings or thoughts, such as
depression, anxiety, tension, anger, generalized distress, or self-criticism,
occurring in the period immediately prior to the self-injurious act.
2. Prior to engaging in the act, a period o f preoccupation with the intended
behavior that is difficult to control.
3. Thinking about self-injury that occurs frequently, even when it is not acted
upon.
The behavior is not socially sanctioned (e.g., body piercing, tattooing, part o f a
religious or cultural ritual) and is not restricted to picking a scab or nail biting.
The behavior or its consequences cause clinically significant distress or
interference in interpersonal, academic, or other important areas of functioning.
The behavior does not occur exclusively during psychotic episodes, delirium,
substance intoxication, or substance withdrawal. In individuals with a
neurodevelopmental disorder, the behavior is not part of a pattern o f repetitive
stereotypies. The behavior is not better explained by another mental or medical
disorder (e.g., psychotic disorder, autism spectrum disorder, intellectual disability,
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, stereotypic movement disorder with self-injury,
trichotillomania [hair-pulling disorder], and excoriation [skin-picking] disorder).

Marsha Linehan (1993) noted that negative state affect is typical of individuals
with Borderline Personality Disorder who self-injure, suggesting an association between
negative affect (e.g., depressed mood) and self-injury. Emotion dysregulation is
significantly associated with self-injury as well as Borderline Personality Disorder (
Bomovalova, Hicks, Patrick, Iacono, & McGue, 2011; Bomovalova et al., 2010; Gratz &
Roemer, 2008; Gratz, Rosenthalet al., 2009). Given, emotion dysregulation has been
associated with Borderline Personality Disorder and self-injury as well as a variety of
other dysregulated behaviors. Assessment of one’s perceived ability to manage his or her
emotions is essential to establishing an adequate conceptual framework for self-injurious
behavior.
NSSI acts as a means o f adjusting negative affective states. Trait impulsivity may
not account for predictive variance, but that as one’s negative state increases so does
one’s need for escape from the negative affective state may increase one’s state
impulsivity (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010). For example, impulsivity/impulsiveness is
increased by one’s emotional state if that state is aversive. Likewise, Gratz and others
(2009) examined the association between group status (BPD or no PD) and two aspects
o f emotion dysregulation (i.e., willingness so experience distress in order to engage in
goal-directed behavior and the ability to engage in goal-directed behavior when
distressed).
Individuals with an under-developed and undifferentiated self-representational
model (as may be present in Borderline Personality Disorder) may experience greater
difficulty accessing aspects o f the self, thereby hindering down-regulation of negative
affect (Kuhl, 2011). According to this contention, the second modulation assumption of
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PSI theory may explain aspects of self-injury not otherwise accounted for by symptoms
o f Borderline Personality Disorder. In contrast, individuals with a fully developed holistic
self are capable o f accessing self-representational knowledge, thereby down-regulating
negative affect in order to maintain goal directed behavior in the face o f stressful events.

Statement of the Problem
Marsha Linehan’s groundbreaking Cognitive Behavioral Treatment o f Borderline
Personality Disorder (1993) highlighted the relationship between self-injury and
Borderline Personality Disorder. The strength o f this relationship has been reinforced by
self-injury becoming a diagnostic criterion for Borderline Personality Disorder (i.e.,
Criterion 5; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Borderline Personality Disorder
per the DSM-IV-TR (2000) was the only diagnosis for which nonsuicidal, non-stereotypic
self-injury was a diagnostic criterion. Shaffer and Jacobson (2010) argued Nonsuicidal
Self-injury is a behavioral phenomenon common among youth aged 12-17 years that it
should be a unique disorder in the DSM-5, however, Nonsuicidal Self-injury is classified
in section III o f the DSM-5 as a condition requiring further research (2013). The current
study responds to the call for further research examining self-injury; specifically, this
study examines the relationships between State Orientation, emotion dysregulation,
Borderline Personality Disorder, and Nonsuicidal Self-injury.
Linehan (1993) identifies higher levels o f negative trait affect (i.e., depressed
mood), suppressed anger (i.e., inhibited anger), and over-control as characteristic of a
typical self-injuring borderline individual. She describes chronic self-injuring borderline
individuals as less likely to display anger outwardly than their non-injurious counterparts;
rather they tend to engage in passive and submissive interpersonal interactions (i.e.,
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shaped behavior patterns). Although many individuals who engage in repeated self-injury
do not meet full criteria for BPD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) the behavior
remains a symptom o f the disorder.
Emotion dysregulation is consistently associated with self-injury (Franklin et al.,
2010; Gratz & Roemer, 2004, 2008; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Mendes, 2008).
According to Klonsky (2007), self-injury is frequently preceded by acute negative affect
and followed by a sense o f relief (or a decrease in negative affect). In fact relief from
negative affect was the most frequently cited function o f self-injury. Additionally,
laboratory proxies for self-injury suggest decreased affective arousal following selfinjurious behavior. In a study conducted by Lloyd-Richardson and colleagues (2007), 2228% o f self-injurious adolescents endorsed intrapersonal, automatic reinforcers for the
behavior, and 19-31% reported social reinforcers for the behavior. The average number
o f reinforcers endorsed in the study was 4.76. Minor self-injurious behaviors were only
associated with intrapersonal, automatic negative reinforcement (e.g., ameliorate negative
affect), whereas moderate self-injurious behaviors were highly correlated interpersonal as
well as intrapersonal functions.
In contrast, the relationship between emotional reactivity and self-injury is less
consistent (Franklin et al., 2010; Glenn et al., 2011). Specifically, Franklin and colleagues
(2010), and Glenn and colleagues (2011) observed discrepancies between emotional
reactivity as measured by self-report, and emotional reactivity as measured by skin
conductance and startle-response, respectively. Janis and Nock (2008) contend that
individuals with a history o f self-injury may be poor reporters of their inner experience
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and the processes underlying their engagement in self-injury; as a result, self-report
measures may not adequately assess affective experiences (Franklin et al., 2010).
Discrepancies between self-report and psychophysiological measures of
emotional reactivity (i.e., Franklin et al., 2010; Glenn et al., 2011) suggest the two
measures assess slightly different aspects of the target construct. The discrepancy
between self-report measures and physiological measures o f emotional reactivity
suggests that negative affect increases with contemplation, which may be indicative o f
ruminative processes.
According to Shaffer and Jacobson (2010), NSSI has frequently been regarded as
an aspect o f Borderline Personality Disorder, which leads to the misconception that
individuals who engage in NSSI have Borderline Personality Disorder. Excluding
attempted suicide, wound picking, and "other" 46.5% o f adolescents in a community
sample endorsed having engaged in self-injurious behavior in the previous year (LloydRichardson et al., 2007). O f the adolescents who reported self-injuring 42 % reported
only one method, 52% reported 2-5 methods, and 6% reported greater than six methods.
African American participants were less likely than their Caucasian counterparts to report
engaging in self-injurious behavior in general and were less likely to endorse moderate
forms o f self-injurious behavior. Self-injurers with a history o f attempted suicide reported
a greater number o f psychiatric hospitalizations and more extensive outpatient treatment
by history, as well as an increased likelihood for current suicidal ideation (Klonsky,
2007).
Selby and colleagues (2012) conducted a study comparing self-injurers without
Borderline Personality Disorder (n = 65), individuals with Borderline Personality
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Disorder who do and do not self-injure (n = 24), and a clinical comparison group that did
not meet criteria for inclusion in either o f the other two groups (n = 482). The
Nonsuicidal Self-injury & Borderline Personality Disorder groups were characterized by
greater emotional lability, abuse history, interpersonal conflict, strange beliefs, and
aggression than the comparison group. The Nonsuicidal Self-injury group was defined
according to DSM-5 section III criteria. The Borderline Personality Disorder group was
defined according to DSM-IV-TR criteria via the Structured Clinical Interview for Axis II
Diagnoses (SCID-II). The Nonsuicidal Self-injury and Borderline Personality Disorder
groups did not differ from one another significantly in overall functioning or symptom
severity, however, Selby and colleagues (2012) argue these results supported the
inclusion o f Nonsuicidal Self-injury as a unique disorder in the DSM-5.
According to Quirin and colleagues (2009), affect is a result o f the activation of
representations within the individual's associative network. This activation occurs on the
pre-conceptual schematic level o f processing. PSI theory highlights the distinction
between affect sensitivity (i.e., how readily and intensely one’s affect shifts to a positive
or negative state) and affect regulation (i.e., how adept one is at maintaining functioning
once an affective state is elicited; Baumann et al., 2007). Furthermore, affect regulation is
composed o f distinct factors including self-motivation and self-relaxation. Acquisition of
adequate self-regulation is essential to the development o f adaptive personality
functioning. When one’s affect regulation is inadequately developed, the risk for
engagement in dysregulated behavior increases. For example, Neuroticism would be a
personality trait in which high negative affect lability and limited (i.e., inadequate) affect
regulation interact to create an increased risk for maladaptive coping (Baumann et al.,
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2007). Glenn & Klonsky (2010) observed decreased premeditation (i.e., impulsive
urgency) among self-injurers, corroborating earlier research suggesting individuals who
engage in self-injury suffer from an affect regulation deficit (e.g., diminished behavioral
inhibition under duress; Lynam et al., 2011). In a study conducted by Gratz and
colleagues (2006) self-injurers were less willing to experience distress in order to
complete a task than their non-injurious counterparts, however, performance on the task
was not significantly different across groups.

Justification for the Present Study
In spite o f recent research indicating self-injury exists in the absence of other
diagnoses (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Klonsky, 2011; Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010),
Nonsuicidal Self-injury, as a distinct disorder, is classified as a condition in need o f
further research (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Historically self-injury has
been pathognomonic (i.e., specifically characteristic or indicative o f a particular disease
or condition) o f BPD, although many individuals who engage in self-injury do not meet
full criteria for BPD (Klonsky et al., 2011; Nock et al., 2006; Selby et al., 2012; Shaffer
& Jacobson, 2010; Zlotnick et al., 1997). Given the relationship between Borderline
Personality Disorder and self-injury (Bomovalova et al., 2010; Selby et al., 2012; Selby
& Joiner, 2009), the relationship between emotion dysregulation and Borderline
Personality Disorder (Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Gratz et al., 2009; Iverson et al., 2012;
Tull et al., 2010) and the relationship between emotion dysregulation and self-injury
(Adrian et al., 2011; Esposito-Smythers et al., 2010; Franklin et al., 2010; Gratz &
Roemer, 2008), further research examining the factors leading to self-injurious behavior
is warranted.

Research suggests there is a relationship between BPD and self-destructive
behavior, including self-injury (Dubo et al., 1997, Chapman et al., 2005; Gratz, 2003;
Selby & Joiner, 2009; Selby et al., 2010; Selby et al., 2012), however, this relationship
may be mediated by emotion dysregulation and rumination (Selby & Joiner, 2009).
Emotion dysregulation has been associated with BPD and NSSI, as well as a variety of
other dysregulated behaviors including: peer (Adrian et al., 2011) substance abuse
(Bomovalova et al., 2011), disordered eating (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010), and domestic
violence (Jakupcak, Salters, Gratz & Roemer, 2003). According to PSI theory (Kuhl,
2000a), state-oriented people ruminate about aversive events as a result of an
inadequately developed self-system and focus on their affective experience at the expense
o f volitional control due to impaired access to the holistic self. State-oriented individuals
respond to challenges by ruminating about the aversive events, which impairs their ability
to generate relevant solutions. According to the emotional cascades model, rumination
plays a significant role in the engagement o f dysregulated behavior, including NSSI
(Selby et al., 2009). Specifically, emotional cascades fully mediated the relationship
between dysregulated behavior and BPD, suggesting rumination is a critical factor
influencing both BPD and NSSI. Similarly, cognitive processes (including rumination)
are associated with emotional dysregulation (Hilt et al., 2008; Selby & Joiner, 2009),
suggesting rumination leads to emotion dysregulation. Given the consistent relationship
between affect regulation and both BPD and NSSI, assessment o f one’s perceived ability
to manage his or her emotions is essential to establishing an adequate conceptual
framework for NSSI.
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The Mediation Model
The specified path diagram is a formal statement (i.e., a hypothesis) about the
hypothesized pattern o f relationships among a set o f variables. Often studies use
mediation analyses to identify a previously unmeasured variable (e.g., State Orientation)
with which two correlated variables (e.g., BPD and NSSI) are both correlated. Mediation
studies attempt to explain the relationship between the two originally correlated variables
in terms o f the mediating variable. For example, the relationship between NSSI and
childhood sexual abuse is well documented (Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Gratz, 2003;
Weierich & Nock, 2008), however, recent research suggests this relationship may be
better explained by a confounding relationship each o f these variables has with other
variables (Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Klonsky & Moyer, 2008; Muehlenkamp, Kerr,
Bradley, & Adams Larsen, 2010; Weierich & Nock, 2008). A recent study that examined
whether posttraumatic stress symptoms mediate the relationship between NSSI and
childhood sexual abuse (Weierich & Nock, 2008) found that both re-experiencing (i.e.,
physiological arousal and intrusive trauma related images) and avoidance/numbing (i.e.,
diminished positive affect, dulled emotions, and efforts to avoid triggers related to
trauma) fully mediate the relationship between NSSI and childhood sexual abuse,
independently. Interestingly, both avoidance/numbing and re-experiencing are reportedly
experienced during episodes o f emotional dysregulation.
The specified model (see Figure 1) suggests that emotion dysregulation leads to
BPD, rather than results from the disorder; furthermore, State Orientation leads to
emotion dysregulation. This argument is based in the notion that a dispositional trait (i.e.,
State Orientation) leads to dysfunction, in contrast to dysfunction leading to the
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dispositional trait. Recall that a dispositional trait is developed in a biosocial manner
(Kuhl, 2000a); specifically, temperamental characteristics interact with environmental
influences to develop dispositional traits that function relatively consistently across
setting and time. These dispositional traits combine to form characteristic adaptations
(McAdams, 2006), which are behavioral representations of personality. Dispositional
traits lead to behavioral patterns (i.e., characteristic adaptations) which in turn lead to
personality development. In other words, a specific type of dysregulated behavior (e.g.,
NSSI) can result from emotion dysregulation in the absence o f a personality disorder (i.e.,
BPD). In the proposed mediation model, State Orientation leads to emotion
dysregulation, which in turn leads to the development of behavioral dysregulation.

Model Hypothesis Justification
The specified model depicts direct paths (a) from State Orientation to emotion
dysregulation, Borderline Personality Disorder, and Nonsuicidal Self-injury.
Furthermore, the specified model depicts indirect paths (b) from State Orientation to
Nonsuicidal Self-injury via emotion dysregulation, and from State Orientation to
Borderline Personality Disorder via emotion dysregulation.
All path coefficients are expected to be positive. There is no path diagrammed
between Borderline Personality Disorder and Nonsuicidal Self-injury, because as the
model indicates, the relationship between Borderline Personality Disorder and
Nonsuicidal Self-injury is fully mediated by the total effects specified in the model. The
specified model suggests NSSI and BPD share a causal trajectory that mediates the
relationship between the two phenomena.
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Consistent with these findings the specified model, shown in Figure 1, depicts the
hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships among State Orientation, emotion
dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and number of NSSI behaviors endorsed.

NSSI

Stale Orientation

Emotion Dysregulation

BPD Symptoms

State Orientation is operationally defined by the Action Control Scale 24 (ACS-24),
reverse scored. Emotion Dysregulation is operationally defined by the Difficulties in
Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). NSSI is operationally defined by the Inventory of
Statements About Self-Injury (ISAS - Behavioral Section). BPD Symptoms are
operationally defined by the McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality
Disorder (MSI-BPD).
The path from State Orientation to emotion dysregulation represents Hypothesis A l. The
path from State Orientation to BPD Symptoms represents Hypothesis A2. The path from
State Orientation to NSSI Behaviors represents Hypothesis A3. The path from emotion
dysregulation to BPD represents Hypothesis B l. The path from emotion dysregulation to
NSSI Behaviors represents Hypothesis B2.________________________________________
Figure 1 The Specified Model
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In the specified model, State Orientation is a biosocial predisposition to emotion
dysregulation which, in turn, leads to BPD symptoms and NSSI uniquely. Furthermore,
the mediation model indicates that State Orientation also indirectly effects number of
BPD symptoms and NSSI behaviors. Finally, the model specifies the path coefficient
between BPD symptoms and NSSI behaviors equal zero.

Model Hypothesis - Mediation of the Relationship Between BPD and NSSI
The proposed model emphasizes the effect of State Orientation on emotion
dysregulation, and the subsequent effect of emotion dysregulation on BPD and NSSI. The
hypothesized causal model suggests State Orientation, leads to emotion dysregulation,
BPD symptoms, and Nonsuicidal Self-injury. Specifically, State Orientation (Kuhl, 1994)
is a dispositional characteristic that leads to emotion dysregulation, BPD, and NSSI. In
the specified model, State Orientation has a total effect on emotion dysregulation, BPD,
and NSSI that fully mediates the relationship between BPD and NSSI. The direct path
between BPD symptoms and number o f different NSSI methods is fixed at zero,
indicating that the relationship between BPD and NSSI does not significantly differ from
zero.

Model Hypothesis
The specified model does not fit the data significantly worse than a just-identified
model. Furthermore, we anticipate that the increased parsimony o f the over-identified
model compensates for the decrease in model fitness. The overall fitness of the specified
model does not significantly differ from an exact fit. The overall fitness o f the specified
model does not significantly differ from the just-identified model as indicated by a non
significant chi-square difference test. Specifically, when the previously free parameter
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(i.e., the path coefficient between BPD symptoms and NSSI methods) is fixed at zero, the
overall fit o f the model does not decrease significantly.

Hypothesis A l - Direct Effect of State Orientation on Emotion Dysregulation
The direct path from State Orientation to emotion dysregulation specifies a
directional relationship between State Orientation and emotion dysregulation. Assuming
that State Orientation, as described above (Kuhl, 2000a, 2011), is similar to the construct
o f rumination (Kuhl & Baumann, 2000; Selby et al., 2009; Selby & Joiner, 2009),
research suggesting rumination leads to dysregulated emotions (Hilt et al., 2008; Selby et
al., 2009; Selby & Joiner, 2009) also suggests that State Orientation is positively
associated with emotion dysregulation. The anticipated positive association between State
Orientation and emotion dysregulation is consistent with these findings. The direct path
between State Orientation and emotion dysregulation represents path the specified causeand-effect relationship between the two variables, respectively.

Hypothesis Al
There is a direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation. According
to the model, State Orientation (as measured by the Action Control Scale; ACS-24)
increases, emotion dysregulation (as measured by the full-scale Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale; DERS) increases, that is, higher scores on the ACS are positively
associated with higher scores on the full-scale DERS. Specifically, State Orientation is an
exogenous variable that, according to the model, directly affects emotion dysregulation
(greater State Orientation, greater emotion dysregulation).

68

Hypothesis A2 - Direct Effect of State Orientation on BPD Symptoms
The direct path from State Orientation to BPD specifies a directional relationship
between State Orientation and BPD. As mentioned above, State Orientation is similar to
the construct o f rumination (Kuhl & Baumann, 2000; Kuhl, 2000b); therefore, research
indicating rumination is positively associated with BPD (Kuhl, 2000a; Selby et al., 2009;
Selby & Joiner, 2009) suggests State Orientation is also positively associated with BPD.
The anticipated positive association between State Orientation and BPD was supported
by these findings. The direct path between State Orientation and BPD represents
hypothesis A2.

Hypothesis A2
There is a direct effect o f State Orientation on Borderline Personality Disorder
symptoms. According to the model, as State Orientation (as measured by the ACS-24)
increases, the number o f Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms endorsed on the
MSI-BPD increases, that is, higher scores on the ACS-24 are positively associated with a
greater number o f Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms endorsed on the MSI-BPD.
Specifically, State Orientation is an exogenous variable that, according to the model,
directly affects Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms (greater State Orientation,
greater number o f BPD symptoms).

Hypothesis A3 - Direct Effect of State Orientation on NSSI
The direct path from State Orientation to NSSI specifies a directional relationship
between State Orientation and NSSI. Recent research suggests that rumination leads to
NSSI (Hilt et al., 2008; Miskey, 2012; Selby et al., 2012) and that rumination is
conceptually similar to State Orientation (Kuhl & Baumann, 2000; Kuhl, 2000b);
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therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize a similar relationship between State Orientation
and NSSI. The anticipated association between State Orientation and NSSI is consistent
with these findings. The direct path between State Orientation and NSSI represents
hypothesis A3.

Hypothesis A3
There is a direct effect of State Orientation on Nonsuicidal Self-injury. According
to the model, as State Orientation (as measured by the ACS-24) increases, the number of
Nonsuicidal Self-injurious behaviors endorsed on the Inventory o f Statements about Selfinjury Scale (ISAS) increases, that is, higher scores on the ACS-24 are positively
associated with a greater number self-injurious behaviors endorsed on the ISAS.
Specifically, State Orientation is an exogenous variable that, according to the model,
directly affects self-injurious behavior (greater State Orientation, greater number o f NSSI
behaviors).

Hypothesis B1 - Indirect Effect of State Orientation on BPD
The indirect path from State Orientation specifies the mediating relationship
between State Orientation and BPD through emotion dysregulation. Recent research
suggests that rumination (i.e., a construct similar to State Orientation) leads to emotion
dysregulation (i.e., an emotional cascade), which in turn, results in the emergence of BPD
(Selby et al., 2009, 2012; Selby & Joiner, 2009). These findings support the hypothesized
indirect path between State Orientation and BPD. The indirect path from State
Orientation to BPD through emotion dysregulation represents hypothesis B 1.
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Hypothesis B1
There is an indirect effect o f State Orientation on Borderline Personality Disorder
via emotion dysregulation. Emotion dysregulation is the mediator that, according to the
model, is affected by State Orientation (greater State Orientation, greater emotion
dysregulation); in turn, emotion dysregulation affects Borderline Personality Disorder
symptoms (greater emotion dysregulation, greater number o f BPD symptoms).
Specifically, emotion dysregulation mediates the relationship between State Orientation
and Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms.

Hypothesis B2 - Indirect Effect of State Orientation on NSSI
Hypothesis B2 examines the mediating relationship between State Orientation and
NSSI through emotion dysregulation. Recent research suggests that rumination (i.e., a
construct similar to State Orientation) leads to emotion dysregulation (i.e., an emotional
cascade), which in turn, leads to dysregulated behavior, including NSSI (Selby et al.,
2012; Selby & Joiner, 2009). These findings support the hypothesized indirect path
between State Orientation and NSSI. The indirect path from State Orientation to NSSI
through emotion dysregulation represents hypothesis B2.

Hypothesis B2
There is an indirect effect o f State Orientation on Nonsuicidal Self-injury via
emotion dysregulation. Emotion dysregulation is the mediator that, according to the
model, is affected by State Orientation (greater State Orientation, greater emotion
dysregulation); in turn, emotion dysregulation affects self-injurious behavior (greater
emotion dysregulation, greater number o f NSSI behaviors endorsed). Specifically,

emotion dysregulation mediates the relationship between State Orientation and
Nonsuicidal Self-injury.

Just-Identified Comparison Model
The just-identified model, shown in Figure 2, specifies direct paths (a) from State
Orientation to emotion dysregulation, Borderline Personality Disorder, and Nonsuicidal
Self-injury. Furthermore, the just-identified model specifies indirect paths (b) from State
Orientation to Nonsuicidal Self-injury via Borderline Personality Disorder and from State
Orientation to Nonsuicidal Self-injury via emotion dysregulation. Finally, the justidentified model specifies an indirect path (c) from State Orientation to Nonsuicidal SelfInjury via emotion dysregulation and Borderline Personality Disorder. Figure 2 provides
a diagrammatic representation of the just-identified model.
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Figure 2 Just-Identified Model

Model Comparison Hypothesis
The current study compares the specified model, in which the relationship
between BPD and NSSI is constrained to zero, to a just-identified model, in which the
relationship between BPD and NSSI is estimated by the data. If the hypothesized
mediation model fit is not appreciably worse than the just-identified model fit, the more
parsimonious model is preferred. Mediation explains the process underlying the
relationship between two (or more) variables (MacKinnon, 2011). Thus, mediation in the
specified model explains the process underlying the relationship between BPD and NSSI.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited via internet-based social networking venues including
Facebook (n = 57), Linkedln (n = 14), Twitter (n = 32), Tumblr (n = 37), personal
referrals (n = 50), and professional referrals (n = 30). Given that recruiting venue
classification was not mutually exclusive, participants may have provided more than one
response to this question. For example, a single participant may have reported having
learned about the study through a personal referral on Facebook. Also, in order to
preserve anonymity individuals were not forced to provide a response regarding source of
recruitment. Visual analysis o f the response patterns, via frequency distribution tables,
indicates that the distribution o f sample data did not become distorted by the
recategorization o f responses.
Individuals who responded to all to the items associated with the study’s
inventories were considered “completers.” O f the 273 people who initiated the study, 213
were considered “completers.” Individuals who endorsed self-injurious behaviors on the
ISAS, a screening instrument used to differentiate individuals who self-injure from those
who do not, responded to questions related to the context and functions of the behavior in
which he or she engages. Individuals who did not respond to the contextual and/or
functional items on the ISAS were included in the analyses as “completers,” because this
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was the criteria for completion if no self-injurious behaviors were endorsed. Specifically,
all cases included in the statistical analyses answered all the target items (i.e., those
included in the path model) in the survey either by endorsement or advancement in the
study without endorsing any self-injurious behaviors. Non-endorsement o f self-injurious
behaviors, resulted in being redirected to a “thank you” page including resource
information related to self-injury and suicide prevention, as well as a link to the “reward
opportunity,” which was not connected in any way to the survey responses. One
individual who completed the survey, per the above mentioned criteria, but selected
“decline to answer” for 25% (i.e., 6 out of 24) o f the items associated with one scale was
eliminated from the data set.

Instruments
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix A), followed
by the Action Control Scale - Short Version (24 items; see Appendix B), the Difficulties
in Emotion Regulation Scale (36 items, see Appendix C), the Inventory of Statements
About Self-injury (12 method items, -1 0 contextual items, and 39 functional items; see
Appendix D), and the McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder
(10 items; see Appendix E). These measures were presented in the order specified above,
for all participants, as is common in research examining affective experiences that may
be influenced by responding to items o f a sensitive nature (Quirin et al., 2009).
Specifically, participants responded to items of a less sensitive nature first and respond to
more provocative items later.
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Demographic Questionnaire
The demographic questionnaire assessed age, gender, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, relationship status, level of education, income, religious affiliation, and how
they had learned about the study. Correlational analyses were employed to test for
significant associations between age and the measured variables. Given that State
Orientation is a dispositional trait, no significant association between age and State
Orientation was anticipated.

Action Control Scale
The Action Control Scale (ACS) is a nonreactive measure of one’s perceived
experience when faced with a frustrating or a daunting task (Kuhl, 1994). Items on a
nonreactive self-report measure are formulated such that the construct being measured is
not obvious to the respondent. Kuhl recommends nonreactive methods of assessing selfregulatory competence (Kuhl, 2000a). The ACS-24 is a 24-item version o f the ACS. The
ACS-24 assesses decision-related (AOD) and failure-related (AOF) action orientation
(Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998). Action orientation is the dimensional and theoretical opposite
o f State Orientation.
Items on the ACS-24 are forced-choice sentence completion statements in which
one response is indicative o f action orientation and the alternate response is indicative of
State Orientation (Kuhl, 1994). Items assessing failure-related State Orientation (i.e.,
preoccupation) include: “When I have lost something valuable and can’t find it
anywhere” and “When I have put all my effort into doing a really good job on something
and the whole thing doesn’t work out.” Responses indicative of failure-related State
Orientation include: “I have a hard time concentrating on anything else” and “I have
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trouble doing anything else at all.” In contrast, responses indicative o f failure-related
action orientation (AOF) include: “I don’t dwell on it” and “I don’t have too much
difficulty starting something else.”
Items assessing decision-related State Orientation (i.e., hesitation) include: “When
I am getting ready to tackle a difficult problem” and “When I am facing a big project that
has to be done.” Responses indicative o f decision-related State Orientation are: “It feels
like I am facing a big mountain that I don’t think I can climb” and “I often spend too long
thinking about where I should begin.” In contrast, responses indicative of decision-related
action orientation (AOD) include: “I look for a way that the problem can be approached
in a suitable manner” and “I don’t have any problems getting started.”
Recent research reporting the psychometric properties o f the ACS demonstrate
good internal consistencies (Cronbach’s a = .83 and a - .85) for the AOD and AOF,
respectively (Baumann et al., 2007). The ACS manual reports moderate internal
consistencies for the AOD (Cronbach’s a = .70), AOF (Cronbach’s a = .78) subscales
and for the combined scale (Cronbach’s a = .81). Observed internal consistencies for the
AOF and AOD subscales as well as the combined ACS are reported in Chapter 3.
The ACS-24 is composed of two dimensions of State Orientation, decision-related
action orientation (i.e., hesitation) and failure-related action orientation (i.e.,
preoccupation). Kuhl (1994) refers to rumination as an aspect o f failure-related State
Orientation, in which perseverating and intrusive cognitions frequently impact one’s
ability to initiate a change in behavior. Furthermore, hesitation involves difficulties
initiating an intended activity, in the absence of ruminative processes. Hesitation is
negatively associated with positive affect (Baumann et al., 2007), suggesting it may also
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be associated with a decreased willingness to down-regulate one’s positive affect. In
other words, individuals high in hesitant State Orientation may be less willing to initiate
activities likely to result in a decrease in positive affect (Baumann et al., 2007; Kuhl,
1994).
The AOD and AOF produce scores ranging from 0-12 (Kuhl, 1994; i.e., an
interval scale). State Orientation scores are calculated by combining the two scale’s (i.e.,
AOD and AOF) reversed scores, producing continuous values ranging from 0-24.
Validation studies reported item means ranging from .26 to .74 for the AOF, and .35 to
.66 for the AOD (Kuhl, 1994).

The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a
comprehensive measure o f overall emotion dysregulation including six subscales:
nonacceptance o f emotional responses (Nonacceptance), lack of emotional awareness
(Awareness), limited access to emotion-regulation strategies (Strategies), difficulties
engaging in goal-directed behavior when emotionally aroused (Goals), impulse-control
difficulties (Impulse), and lack of emotional clarity (Clarity). The DERS is a widely
accepted, reliable and valid measure of emotion dysregulation in adults, and a moderately
supported measure o f emotion dysregulation in adolescents (Weinberg & Klonsky, 2009).
The DERS is a 36-item self-report measure designed to assess emotion
dysregulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Respondents indicate on a Likert scale ranging
from 1-5 the frequency with which items are self-relevant; that is, how often each item
applies to oneself. The items are weighted as follows: 1 is almost never (0-10%), 2 is
sometimes (11-35%), 3 is about h a lf the time (36-65%), 4 is most o f the time (66-90%),
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and 5 is almost always (91-100%). All items are recoded (i.e., reverse scored where
necessary) so that higher scores indicate greater difficulty regulating one’s emotions (i.e.,
greater emotion dysregulation).
The nonacceptance subscale consists o f six items; the goals subscale consists of
five items; the impulse subscale consists o f six items; the awareness subscale consists of
six items; the strategies subscale consists of eight items; and the clarity subscale consists
o f five items (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Sample items for each subscale include: “When
I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way” (nonacceptance); “When I’m upset, I have
difficulty concentrating” (goals); “When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviors”
(impulse); “I am attentive to my feelings” (awareness); “When I’m upset, I believe that
I’ll end up feeling very depressed” (strategies); and “I have difficulty making sense out of
my feelings” (clarity).
The psychometric validity o f the DERS has been established in a variety of
populations; the full measure and its subscales exhibited good internal consistency, testretest reliability, and construct validity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004, 2008; Turner et al., 2012;
Vasilev, Crowell, Beauchaine, Mead, & Gatzke-Kopp, 2009; Weinberg & Klonsky,
2009). In the initial psychometric study o f the DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), internal
consistency for the overall scale was high (Cronbach’s a = .93, p < .05) and internal
consistency for the six subscales was moderate (Cronbach’s a >.80,/? < .05). Observed
internal consistencies for the full-scale DERS and DERS subscales are reported in
Chapter 3.
The predictive validity o f the DERS is supported by correlations with NSSI and
intimate partner abuse, both behavioral examples o f emotion dysregulation (Gratz et al.,
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2009; Gratz & Roemer, 2008; Selby & Joiner, 2009). The construct validity of the DERS
is supported by correlations among DERS scales and the General Expectancy for
Negative Mood Regulation Scale (NMR), the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, and
the Emotional Expressivity Scale (i.e., negative associations). As noted above, poor
negative mood regulation and experiential avoidance are aspects o f emotion
dysregulation (Gratz, Rosenthalet al., 2009; Iverson et al., 2012) and emotional
expressivity is an aspect o f emotion regulation (Tull et al., 2007).
Sex differences between males and females and the predictive utility o f the DERS
for NSSI were observed (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Specifically, the overall DERS score,
and the Goals, Strategies, and Clarity subscale scores significantly predict NSSI in
females, whereas in males, the overall DERS score and the Non-acceptance and Impulse
subscale scores significantly predict NSSI scores. Interestingly, overall DERS scores
predict NSSI in both males and females. Permission to use the DERS may be obtained
upon request from the author, and was granted via electronic mail. The full-scale DERS
score ranges from 36-180; means and standard deviations in the initial validation study
among men and women were (M = 77.99, SD = 20.72) and (M = 80.66, SD = 18.79),
respectively. Full-scale DERS scores did not significantly differ between men and
women.

Inventory of Statements About Self-Injury
The Inventory o f Statements About Self-injury (ISAS; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009;
Klonsky & Olino, 2008) is a comprehensive measure o f the frequency of 12 specific selfinjurious methods (i.e., cutting, hitting self, etc.) and 13 reported functions (i.e., see
Klonsky, 2007 for a full review) o f self-injury, as well as its contextual features (e.g.,
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alone, with peers, under the influence o f alcohol, etc.)- According to Latimer and others
(2013), the ISAS assesses a moderate breadth o f self-injurious behaviors. Prevalence as
measured by the ISAS (i.e., 25%; Klonsky & Olino, 2008) was comparable to previous
research examining self-injury (i.e., 17%; Whitlock et al., 2006); these findings are more
conservative than those observed by others using the Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory
(i.e., 31 - 35%; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gratz, 2001; LeBoeuf-Davis & Mitchell, 2012).
In another study, self-injury rates as measured by the ISAS were higher (i.e., 31%;
Klonsky & Glenn, 2009) and more similar to those previously mentioned as measured by
the Deliberate Self-harm Inventory (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gratz, 2001; LeBoeuf-Davis
& Mitchell, 2012). These findings suggest the ISAS provides a moderate estimate of the
prevalence o f NSSI in non-clinical populations.
The first section o f the ISAS assesses lifetime frequency o f 12 methods of NSSI
including banging/ hitting self, biting, burning, carving, cutting, wound picking, needlesticking, pinching, hair pulling, rubbing skin against rough surfaces, severe scratching,
and swallowing chemicals (Klonsky & Olino, 2008). Respondents indicate the estimated
incidence o f each o f the 12 methods of NSSI. Five additional questions assess descriptive
and contextual factors, including age o f onset, the experience of pain during NSSI,
whether NSSI is performed alone or around others, time between the urge to self-injure
and the act, and whether the individual wants to stop self-injuring; the latter four use a
multiple-choice format. The ISAS distinguishes between cutting and carving (i.e., cutting
and carving are unique items o f the ISAS), which is important because the ISAS has
demonstrated differential frequencies between cutting and carving, and latent class

comparison suggests carving is associated with greater BPD symptoms than cutting alone
(Klonsky & Olino, 2008).
A recent study comparing six frequently used measures o f NSSI suggests the
ISAS has fair internal consistency. In fact, the ISAS demonstrated the highest internal
consistency (a = .826) o f the six measures (Latimer, Meade, & Tennant, 2013). NSSI
scores were calculated based on the absence (0) or presence (1) o f each method assessed
by the behavioral section of the ISAS. Latimer and colleagues (2013) also revealed
differential item functioning for cutting; that is, females were significantly more likely to
endorse this item than males. All items on the ISAS demonstrated adequate fit. Local
response dependency was observed between cutting and carving, biting and pinching, and
severe scratching, interfering with wound healing, and rubbing skin against rough
surface. Although Latimer and others (2013) argue cutting and carving should be
collapsed into a single item based on statistical grounds, variable rates and class
differences (Klonsky & Olino, 2008) suggest the distinction between these two items is
clinically relevant. The functional section (i.e., section II) o f the ISAS was not included
in the study.
Item hierarchies are derived from logits, based on the assumption that a lower
frequency item assumes endorsement o f higher frequency items. In other words, the less
likely an item (i.e., a behavior) is to be endorsed, the more likely it is other items (i.e.,
behaviors) would also be endorsed. The item hierarchy o f the ISAS ranged from a logit =
1.351 for banging or hitting self to logit = 1.015 for sticking self with needles (Latimer et
al., 2013). Item hierarchies are based on the ease with which an item is endorsed,
suggesting greater representation of the construct being measured for items further up the
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hierarchy. For example, with the ISAS hitting oneself would be considered a low severity
item in contrast to sticking oneself with needles, which would be considered a high
severity item. Interestingly, Klonsky and Olino (2008) found a severe class of selfinjurers was more likely than the other three classes identified in the analysis to report
carving and sticking oneself with needles, suggesting these behaviors are indicative of
more severe self-injurious behavior patterns.
One-year test-retest reliability with 63% o f the original sample retained at the
one-year follow-up study ranged from .52 (biting) to .83 (burning), with a median of .68
(Glenn & Klonsky, 2011). Due to significant outliers in the frequency o f some NSSI
behaviors, Spearman’s rho was computed to measure test-retest reliability (stability). Due
to habitual performance, some NSSI behaviors (e.g., pinching, pulling hair, and
banging/hitting self) resulted in very high estimated frequencies. Results indicated good
test-retest reliability over one-year, suggesting moderate to fair measurement stability of
NSSI over one year.
The behavioral section (section 1) of the ISAS assessed the number of different
methods o f NSSI and their frequency. Permission to use the ISAS was gained upon
request from the author, and was granted via email. Research indicates that the number of
different methods employed is a reliable and valid measure of NSSI severity (Latimer et
al., 2013; Robertson et al., 2012). Measures o f self-injury frequently assess lifetime
presence o f various self-injurious behaviors, however, remoteness in memory o f the
occurrence may adversely impact frequency estimates. The current study assessed
lifetime and past-year presence o f 12 different specific NSSI methods (with the option to
report non-included methods).

Recent research examining the one-year test-retest reliability o f the ISAS
indicated open response format estimates o f NSSI result in a highly skewed frequency
distribution, which is problematic for analyses assuming normality (Glenn & Klonsky,
2011). One method o f reducing the impact o f highly skewed data, is the use of
dichotomous scoring o f each method (i.e., no - 0, yes - 1) in which the total number of
endorsed methods is summed, producing a continuous variable. Summing number o f
different behaviors endorsed also results in a positively skewed frequency distribution,
but eliminates extreme outliers. In the current study, ISAS scores for use in the path
analysis range from 0-13, where a score of 0 indicates never having engaged in any o f the
methods o f self-injury assessed by the ISAS, and a score o f 13 indicates having engaged
in all o f the methods o f self-injury assessed by the ISAS (including an “other” method).
The number o f endorsed self-injurious behaviors are summed to create the NSSI variable
score. We anticipated positively skewed and leptokurtic NSSI scores (see data analytic
plan regarding transformation).
Klonsky and Olino (2008) presented lifetime frequency data according to the
following ranges o f behavior(s) 0, 1-2, 3-10, and > 10 times per method, data were
specific to the ISAS. Similarly, Nock and Prinstein (2004) reported observed frequency
o f methods as measured by a similar instrument (i.e., the FASM) according to the
following ranges o f behavior(s) 0, 1, 2-5, 6-10, >/= 11. Raw frequencies (lifetime and
past-year) are reported as descriptive data according to the ranges used by Nock and
Prinstein (2004), as they allow for greater variability and distinguish a single incident of
self-injury form multiple incidents.

Individuals who endorse one or more methods o f NSSI complete a second section
of the ISAS, which assesses 13 commonly reported functions (i.e., motivations) for NSSI:
affect-regulation, anti-dissociation, anti-suicide, autonomy, interpersonal boundaries,
interpersonal influence, marking distress, peer bonding, self-care, self-punishment,
revenge, sensation seeking, and toughness (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009). The 13 functions
represent two distinct factors, interpersonal and intrapersonal functions. These two
factors are conceptually similar to the social and automatic reinforcers proposed by Nock
and Prinstein (2004, 2005) a contention that has been statistically supported (Glenn &
Klonsky, 2009; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Klonsky & Olino, 2008). An individual who
reports engagement in one or more methods o f self-injury, rates the relevance of each
function on the following 3-point Likert scale (0 = not relevant, 1 = somewhat relevant, 3
= very relevant) for each endorsed method.
Internal consistency was high for the interpersonal function (Cronbach’s a = .88,
p < .05) and moderate for the intrapersonal function (Cronbach’s a = .80, p < .05).
Predictive validity for the ISAS was supported by correlations among the two factors and
the clinical variables including: Depression, Anxiety, BPD, and solitary engagement in
the behavior (i.e., engaging in self-injury while alone).

McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline
Personality Disorder (MSI-BPD)
The McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder (MSIBPD) is a 10-item dichotomous (i.e., true/false), self-report measure, with excellent
sensitivity and specificity (i.e., above .90) based on DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for
BPD (Zanarini et al., 2003). The MSI-BPD exhibits adequate internal consistency (a =
.73). The MSI-BPD has been used in studies examining BPD (Chanen et al., 2008) and
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NSSI (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Klonsky & Olino, 2008), and is beneficial to this study
because it assesses BPD per the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 2013).
Permission to use the MSI-BPD is gained upon request from the author, and was granted
via email.
Scores on the MSI-BPD range from 0-10, where 0 indicates endorsement of none
o f the items assessing BPD symptoms and 10 indicates endorsement of all o f the items
assessing BPD symptoms. Item frequencies in the initial validation study ranged from
44.5% (dissociation) to 82.5% (distrustfulness). Full-criteria for BPD per the DSM-5
includes nine specific criteria, however, initial validation statistics for the MSI-BPD
indicated two distinct items best assess the paranoia/dissociation diagnostic criterion. A
single item for each criterion assesses all other criteria. In the current study, MSI-BPD
scores ranged from 0-9 rather than 0-10 to avoid creating a false relationship between
BPD symptoms (exclusive o f self-injury) and NSSI.
Although inclusion o f the MSI-BPD item pertaining to engagement in selfmutilation did not significantly increase the zero-order correlation between self-injury
and Borderline Personality Disorder (Chapman et al., 2005), statistical exclusion of the
item is warranted because the path coefficient between the two variables is fixed at zero
(i.e., no path is depicted in the model) inclusion of the item may create an inflated
relationship between NSSI and BPD. Given that partial mediation was achieved with
criterion 5 included, and full mediation was achieved after excluding the item from the
analyses (Selby et al., 2009), statistical exclusion o f the item is warranted.
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Procedure
Participants were directed to a cloud based survey system (i.e., SurveyMonkey®)
where they read an Informed Consent page, requiring acknowledgement o f being at least
18 years o f age and willingness to participate in the study (see Appendix F for the Human
Use Committee Approval Form). Participants were informed o f their right to withdraw
from the study at any time and an exit button labeled, “I no longer wish to participate in
this study” was provided on each page o f the survey. Recruitment announcements read,
“We are seeking adults aged 18 and 99 years to participate in a study examining how
one’s ability to handle his or her emotions when upset may lead to engagement in poor
coping strategies. Participation involves responding to an online questionnaire (including
items o f a personal nature). The questionnaire should take approximately 25-40 minutes
to complete. Upon completion o f the study you will be redirected to a separate survey
(only your contact information will be obtained and will not be connected to your
responses to the other items) and given the opportunity to enter a drawing for one o f
several $25 rewards. You may only participate in the study one time. Feel free to forward
the study link to others who may be interested in participating.”
Following informed consent, participants responded to survey items. Measures
were presented in the following order: the demographic questionnaire, the ACS-24, the
DERS, the MSI-BPD, and the ISAS. Upon completion o f the study, participants read a
debriefing statement providing links to resources for self-injury (e.g.,
www.selfinjury.com) and suicide prevention (i.e.,
http://www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org/). Selfinjury.com is a trigger free support venue
(i.e., the site is moderated to prevent negative behavioral contagion) and resource,

providing information regarding service providers (including local providers where
available), institutional interventions, and family support. Suicidepreventionlifeline.org is
a federally funded resource in connection with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration. Resources available at suiciepreventionlifeline.org include live
chat, a 24-hour hotline, blogs, educational videos, and virtual supports (e.g., free e-cards
for those in need). Individuals who exited the study prior to completion, were also
redirected to the debriefing statement and the reward opportunity.
The debriefing statement offered participants the opportunity to enter a weekly
drawing for $25. In order to preserve anonymity regarding sensitive content, participants
interested in entering the drawing were redirected to a separate survey, at which time they
provided contact information required to enter the weekly drawing. There were no efforts
to connect survey responses to participation in the rewards program.

Data Analytic Strategy
The current study used path analysis to test patterns o f causation among the
independent, mediating, and dependent variables in the specified model (Hoyle, 2011;
Kline, 2011; Pedhazur, 1982). Path analysis uses hierarchical multiple regression
analyses to estimate the magnitude and direction o f the effects specified in the model
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hoyle, 2011; Kline, 2011). Path analysis assumes the estimated
relationships are linear, additive, and causal. A unidirectional causal flow is assumed.
Measured variables are on an interval scale; Likert, summative, and ratio scales satisfy
this assumption, however, in psychological research ratio scores are frequently positively
skewed (Selby et al., 2009).
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Path diagrams are graphical depictions o f the specified pattern o f relationships
among a set o f variables; the path diagram is a formal statement (i.e., a hypothesis) about
the statistical relationships between variables. Each path leading to the dependent
variable contributes to the causal explanation of that dependent variable (Baron & Kenny,
1986). When the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable is no
longer significant after accounting for the relationship between the independent and an
intervening variable, full mediation has occurred.
Variables can be simultaneously independent and dependent (i.e., mediating). In
the following causal chain, A > B > C, B is an independent and dependent variable.
Variable B is theoretically caused by independent variable A, and subsequently a cause of
dependent variable C through the mediating variable B. Mediation analyses attempt to
explain the processes underlying the relationship between two (or more) variables
(MacKinnon, 2011). Figure 3 is an example of a simple mediation model (MacKinnon,
2011 ).
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Figure 3 Simple Mediation Model

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

The following chapter presents the results o f the data analyses and hypotheses
tested. First, means, standard deviations, internal consistencies, and scale (subscale)
correlations are presented. Second, item total correlations, inter-item correlations, alpha if
item deleted, and alpha with item included are presented for appropriate. Third,
individual path analyses are discussed. Finally, estimation procedures for goodness o f fit
and comparative fit are reported.

Participants
In the current study, 80% (n = 172) o f participants identified as female; 18% (n =
39) identified as male; and < 2% (n = 2) identified as “other.” Participants ranged in age
from 18 to 73 years, average age was 36.83 years, with a standard deviation of 12.58.
Age was significantly negatively correlated with all 4 variables in the specified model, at
the .01 level o f significance; State Orientation (r = -.28), emotion dysregulation (r = .32), BPD symptoms (r = -.32), and NSSI behaviors (r = -.34). In the current study,
75.1% (n = 160) o f participants identified as heterosexual; 5.6% (n = 12) identified as
homosexual; 12.7% (n = 27) identified as bisexual; 3.8% (n = 8) identified as pansexual;
< 1% (n = 1) identified as asexual; and 2.3% (n - 5) of participants did not reply to the
sexual orientation question. In response to the level of education question, 7.5% (n = 16)
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o f participants reported having a high school diploma or equivalent: 3.3% (n = 7)
reported a vocational or technical degree; 21.1% (n = 45) reported some college; 20.7%
(n = 44) reported having a 4-year degree; 26.8% (n = 57) reported having a master’s
degree; 16.4% reported having a doctoral degree, <1% reported a professional degree;
and 3.3% (n = 7) reported “other” (e.g., multiple licenses, grammar school, associate’s
degree).
The categorical income question, is a demographic item generated by
SurveyMonkey® that includes, “I’d rather not say,” as a valid response. Thirteen
participants selected, “I’d rather not say,” regarding income. Income was divided into six
categories: </= $29,999 (n = 51); $30,000 - $49,999 (n = 33); $50,000-$74,999 (n = 46);
$75,000-$99,999 (n = 27); $100,000-$ 150,000 (n = 25); >/= $150,000 (n = 18). Fifty-one
percent o f participants identified as Christian (n = 105), thirty-seven percent of
participants identified as Not Religious (n = 78), five percent of participants identified as
Jewish (n = 10), three percent identified as Buddhist (n = 7), and less than one percent
identified as Muslim (n = 1).

Psychometric Properties for Measured Variables
ACS-24
The ACS-24 was used in this study because it assesses a construct not represented
in the self-injury literature. No illogical scores (i.e., values outside the range of the scale)
were detected, either statistically, or through visual examination o f the item total and
crosstab matrices. Mean scale and subscale scores for the ACS-24 are presented in Table
1.
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Table 1
ACS-24 Descriptive Statistics
Scale

Mean

Std. Deviation

State Orientation

11.70

5.338

Hesitation

5.52

3.139

Premeditation

6.18

3.126

n = 213

Review o f the ACS-24 item statistics indicate that item frequencies ranged from
.78 (Item 1) to .23 (Item 11). In other words, 78% o f participants endorsed Item 1 and
23% o f participants endorsed Item 11. All other items on the ACS-24 indicative of State
Orientation were endorsed by between 26% and 76% of participants. These rates of
endorsement are similar to those observed by Kuhl (1994) in the initial validation study
(26 to 74%). These findings suggest the ACS-24 items assess a dispositional tendency,
not a pathological construct.
Examination o f Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted indicates the preoccupation
subscale’s internal consistency (a = .79, p < .05) would not be improved by deletion of
any o f the items on the subscale, as shown in Table 2. Corrected item-total coefficients
were improved by evaluating the preoccupation subscale items separately from the
hesitation subscale. Corrected item-total correlations for the preoccupation subscale
ranged from .27 (ACS7) to .57 (ACS3).
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Table 2
Preoccupation Item-Total Statistics

ACS1

5.71

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
8.388

ACS3

6.14

7.834

.566

.760

ACS5

6.08

8.356

.341

.783

ACS7

5.72

8.727

.265

.788

ACS9

5.87

8.217

.401

.777

ACS 11

6.26

8.381

.411

.776

ACS 13

5.82

8.106

.463

.770

ACS 15

5.94

7.963

.481

.768

ACS 17

5.79

8.402

.359

.781

ACS 19

5.92

7.938

.495

.767

ACS21

6.12

8.159

.424

.774

ACS23

6.01

7.877

.513

.765

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Item

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
.423

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
.775

Examination o f Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted indicates the hesitation
subscale’s internal consistency (a = .78, p < .05) would not be improved by deletion of
any o f the items on the subscale, as shown in Table 3. Corrected item-total coefficients
were improved by evaluating the hesitation subscale items separately from the
preoccupation subscale. Corrected item-total correlations for the hesitation subscale
ranged from .21 (ACS 16) to .60 (ACS 14).
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Table 3
Hesitation Item-Total Statistics

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
.363

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
.766

ACS2

5.00

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
8.603

ACS4

5.18

8.557

.384

.764

ACS6

5.33

8.586

.449

.758

ACS8

5.05

8.605

.356

.767

ACS 10

5.28

8.898

.291

.773

ACS 12

4.99

8.333

.465

.755

ACS 14

5.14

7.975

.599

.740

ACS 16

5.15

9.027

.211

.782

ACS 18

5.09

8.545

.378

.765

ACS20

5.02

8.166

.523

.749

ACS22

4.98

8.426

.433

.759

ACS24

5.14

8.158

.527

.748

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Item

As noted in Table 3, corrected item total correlations for the individual subscales
indicate that these values are impacted by items not on the subscale associated with the
specific item. In other words, items on the preoccupation subscale were not, and are not
expected to be, highly correlated with items on the hesitation subscale. No items on the
ACS-24 appeared to significantly influence the full-scale mean. Corrected item total
correlations are discussed above in the inter-item analyses of the ACS-24 subscales. As
shown in Table 4, item-total statistics indicate that the observed internal consistency of

ACS-24 (a = .84, p < .05) would not be improved by the exclusion o f any items included
in the scale. Corrected item total correlations for the individual items range from .24
(ACS2) to .50 (ACS 14).

Table 4
ACS-24 Item-Total Statistics

Item
ACS1
ACS2
ACS3
ACS4
ACS5
ACS6
ACS7
ACS8
ACS9
ACS 10
ACS 11
ACS 12
ACS 13
ACS 14
ACS 15
ACS 16
ACS 17
ACS 18
ACS 19
ACS20
ACS21
ACS22
ACS23
ACS24

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
11.44
11.64
11.89
11.78
11.82
11.97
11.47
11.70
11.60
11.90
11.99
11.62
11.56
11.78
11.68
11.80
11.53
11.71
11.66
11.66
11.86
11.63
11.76
11.78

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
26.420
26.734
25.678
25.736
26.287
25.873
26.947
26.280
26.069
26.088
26.280
25.963
26.168
25.419
25.772
26.149
26.262
26.516
25.516
25.872
25.803
26.064
25.454
26.071

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
.374
.235
.472
.434
.326
.471
.236
.321
.377
.390
.395
.396
.370
.499
.425
.351
.359
.273
.480
.407
.435
.373
.489
.365

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
.833
.839
.829
.831
.835
.830
.838
.835
.833
.832
.832
.832
.833
.828
.831
.834
.834
.837
.829
.832
.831
.833
.828
.833
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Examination o f the ACS-24 subscales and full-scale correlation matrix
indicates both subscales, hesitation (r = .85) and preoccupation (r - .85), are
significantly correlated with the full-scale at the .01 level, as seen in Table 5. The
subscales are moderately correlated with one another (r = .45).
Table 5
ACS-24 Scale Correlations
State
Orientation
1

Scale

Pearson Correlation
State Orientation Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Hesitation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Premeditation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

213
.853
.000
213
.851"
.000
213
(2-tailed).

Hesitation Premeditation

1
213
.452**
.000
213

1
213

DERS
The full-scale DERS scores were used to operationalize emotion dysregulation in
the current study. Means and standard deviations for the full-scale DERS and subscales
are reported in Table 6.
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Table 6
DERS Descriptive Statistics

Scale

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Emotion
Dysregulation

75.61

25.614

Awareness

13.71

5.436

Clarity

7.69

3.315

Goals

13.92

5.274

Impulse

10.83

5.112

Nonacceptance

12.95

6.258

Strategies

16.49

7.511

n = 213

Examination o f the DERS inter-item correlation matrices for the subscales,
Nonacceptance, Goals, Clarity, Strategies, Awareness, and Impulse, indicate that, as
noted in the associated psychometric literature, the six subscales are unique. As a result,
inter-item correlations for the subscales are discussed separately. Review o f the
Nonacceptance subscale item statistics indicates that item means ranged from 2.05 (Items
21) to 2.33 (Item 23). Inter-item correlation coefficients indicate inter-item correlations
ranged from .65 to .80, suggesting that the individual items on the Nonacceptance
subscale are significantly correlated with one another. The mean for the Nonacceptance
subscale in the current sample was 12.95 with a standard deviation of 6.27.
The Goals subscale item statistics indicates that item means ranged from 2.54
(Item 33) to 3.05 (Item 18). Inter-item correlation coefficients indicate inter-item
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correlations ranged from .55 to .75, suggesting that the individual items on the Goals
subscale are significantly correlated with one another. The mean for the Goals subscale in
the current sample was 13.97 with a standard deviation of 5.27.
Examination o f the Impulse subscale item statistics indicates that item means
ranged from 1.55 (Item 14) to 2.17 (Item 24). Inter-item correlation coefficients indicate
inter-item correlations ranged from .37 to .80, suggesting that the individual items on the
Impulse subscale are significantly correlated with one another. The mean for the Impulse
subscale in the current sample was 10.80 with a standard deviation o f 5.12.
Interpretation o f the Awareness subscale item statistics indicates that item means
ranged from 2.02 (Item 8) to 2.79 (Item 34). Inter-item correlation coefficients indicate
inter-item correlations ranged from .33 to .68, suggesting that the individual items on the
Awareness subscale are significantly correlated with one another. The mean for the
Awareness subscale in the current sample was 13.73 with a standard deviation of 5.39.
Item statistics for the Strategies subscale indicate that item means ranged from
1.74 (Item 31) to 2.48 (Item 36). Inter-item correlation coefficients indicate inter-item
correlations ranged from .55 to .77, suggesting that the individual items on the Strategies
subscale are significantly correlated with one another. The mean for the Strategies
subscale in the current sample was 16.50 with a standard deviation of 7.56.
The Clarity subscale item statistics indicates that item means ranged from 1.61
(Item 4) to 2.30 (Item 7). Inter-item correlation coefficients indicate inter-item
correlations ranged from .37 to .74, suggesting that the individual items on the Clarity
subscale are significantly correlated with one another. The mean for the Clarity subscale
in the current sample was 10.01 with a standard deviation of 3.96.
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Examination o f the item-total correlation matrix indicates that the internal
consistency o f the DERS would not be improved by the removal o f any o f the items
included in the scale. Given that the DERS is composed o f six subscales, the corrected
item-total correlations were not interpreted in the full-scale analysis. Corrected item-total
correlations for individual subscales are available upon request. The DERS exhibited
exceptional internal consistency (a = .96, p < .05) in the current study. The mean for the
full-scale DERS in the current sample was 78.05 with a standard deviation of 26.24.
Given that the DERS is a multi-dimensional measure of emotion dysregulation,
inter-correlations between the full-scale and subscales are presented in Table 7. Inter
correlations between the scales ranged from .36 to .74. With the exclusion of Goals and
Awareness (a = .33, p = .099) subscales, all inter-scale correlations were significant at the
.01 level.

Table 7
DERS Scale and Subscale Correlations
Scale
Awareness

Clarity

Goals

Impulse

Nonacceptance

Strategies

Awareness Clarity Goals Impulse Nonacceptance Strategies Emotion Dysregulation
Pearson Correlation

1

N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

213
.677
.000
213
.113
.099
213
.328
.000
213

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation

Emotion Dysregulation Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1
213
.353
.000
213
.574
.000
213

1
213
.604
.000
213
.528
.000
213

1
213
.559
.000
213

213

.735
.000
213

.673
.000
213

.820

.809

213
.903

1

.379
.000
213
.359
.000
213
.587

.513
.000
213

.745

.741
.000
213
.742

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

213

213

213

213

213

213

.543
.000
213

1

1
213

100
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MSI-BPD
Review o f the MSI-BPD item statistics indicate that item frequencies ranged from
.20 (Item 7) to .58 (Item 6), suggesting Item 7 was endorsed less frequently than Item 6.
In other words, 20% o f participants endorsed Item 7 and 58% of participants endorsed
Item 6. All other items on the MSI-BPD were endorsed by between 24% and 52% of
participants. These findings shown in Table 8 suggest the MSI-BPD items assess
symptoms more frequently observed in the general population than specific self-injurious
behaviors but less frequently than items on the ACS-24. The overall mean for the MSIBPD was 3.70 with a standard deviation o f 2.92. Internal consistency was moderate (a =
.78, p < .05). Cronbach’s alpha indicate no items should be eliminated from the scale to
improve internal consistency. Corrected item-total correlation coefficients indicate that
the items are moderately associated with the overall scale.

Table 8
MSI-BPD Item-Total Statistics

Item
MSI1
MSI2
M SB
MSI4
MSI5
MSI6
MSI7
MSI8
MSI9
MSI10

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
3.18
3.42
3.26
3.22
3.33
3.13
3.50
3.36
3.45
3.46

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted
7.089
7.061
6.925
6.446
6.990
7.363
7.398
6.943
6.959
7.359

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
.349
.520
.508
.663
.461
.305
.435
.425
.494
.414

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
.781
.758
.759
.737
.764
.784
.769
.770
.760
.770
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ISAS
Binary item means represent the participant endorsement rate. Review of the
ISAS descriptive statistics, presented in Table 9, indicates that the most frequently
reported NSSI behaviors include banging/hitting, cutting, and interfering with wound
healing (15%), with severe scratching reported relatively frequently (10%) as well.

Table 9
ISAS Descriptive Statistics
Behavior
Banging/Hitting Self

Mean
.15

Std. Deviation
.363

Biting

.04

.191

Burning

.05

.212

Carving

.02

.136

Cutting

.15

.363

Interfering w/ Wound

.15

.358

Other

.05

.212

Pinching

.08

.272

Pulling Hair

.09

.286

Rubbing Rough

.02

.152

Severe Scratching

.10

.299

Sticking w/ Needles

.01

.118

Swallowing Substances

.04

.191

Valid N (listwise)
n = 213
All other behaviors were reported by fewer than ten percent o f participants,
suggesting endorsement o f self-injurious behaviors is a relatively infrequently observed
phenomena in the general population. It should be noted that measures assessing
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psychopathological characteristics are frequently positively skewed with non
endorsement o f items common among individuals within the general populations. In
other words, means o f . 15 on the ISAS in contrast to means o f .78 on the ACS-24 are not
indicative o f problems with the scale’s internal consistency.

Preliminary Data Analysis
Data were visually screened for outliers, missing values, illogical values, and
violations o f assumptions. Following preliminary data screening, threats to statistical
assumptions including univariate and multivariate outliers, problematic skewness (i.e.,
skew index > 3) and kurtosis (i.e., kurtosis index > 10; Kline, 2011) were evaluated. A
recent study employed square-root transformation to remediate significantly skewed
NSSI scores (Selby et al., 2009) resulting in an acceptable distribution of transformed
scores. In the current study, NSSI scores were square-root transformed to adjust for
problematic skewness. Data were evaluated pre and post transformation, and judiciously
transformed, in order to minimally impact score resolution. As expected, NSSI scores
were positively skewed (skew = 2.32) prior to transformation and (skew = 1.66) post
transformation. Although skew statistics equal to 2.3 do not exceed the threshold (skew >
3), transformation o f the NSSI behaviors scale resulted in improved inter-correlation
coefficients among scales, suggesting the scale’s deviation from normality negatively
affected correlations among scales. No other univariate variable scores significantly
deviated from normality (i.e., no other extreme skewness or kurtosis). No multivariate
violations o f assumptions were detected.
Given that path analysis assumes inter-correlations between measured variables, a
correlation matrix was generated in order to confirm the anticipated relationships among

the constructs measured in the study. Examination o f the inter-scale correlation matrix
between State Orientation, emotion dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and NSSI behaviors
indicates significant bivariate correlations between each pair of measures. The inter
correlation between the ISAS and the ISAS transformed (r = .99) indicates that the
transformation o f the ISAS did not significantly impact the resolution of the scale. The
inter-correlation between the MSI-BPD (including Item 2) and MSI-BPD (excluding Item
2; r = .99) suggests that the scale is measuring the same construct with and without Item
2. Both scales are included in Table 12 in order to examine the impact exclusion of Item
2 has on the inter-correlations of the MSI-BPD and the other scales included in the study.
As noted, the exclusion o f Item 2 did not significantly impact the scale’s relationship
with the other scales.
All o f the inter-scale correlations were significant at the .01 level, with correlation
coefficients ranging from r = 2 1 , between the ACS-24 and the ISAS, to r = .67,
between the DERS and the MSI-BPD (including Item 2). It is noteworthy that the second
largest inter-correlation between scale scores was exhibited between the MSI-BPD
(excluding Item 2) and the DERS. However, the next largest relationship observed is
between the DERS and the ISAS (r = .56). These findings suggest emotion dysregulation
(as measured by the DERS) has a significant and strong association with both ISAS scale
scores and MSI-BPD scale scores. Furthermore, the weakest relationship observed in the
table is between the ISAS and the ACS-24.
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Table 10
Scale Inter-Correlations

Scale

MSIMSIBPD
BPD
ACSISAS
DERS
Scale
ISAS
(Item 2
24
Transformed
(Item 2
excluded)
Included)

Pearson
1
Correlation
DERS
Sig. (2tailed)
N
213
Pearson
.594**
1
Correlation
ACS-24
Sig. (2.000
tailed)
213
N
213
Pearson
.671** .454**
1
MSI-BPD Scale Correlation
Score (Item 2
Sig. (2.000 .000
Included)
tailed)
212
212
212
N
**
Pearson
1
.640** .441** .991
Correlation
MSI-BPD (Item
Sig. (2.000 .000
2 excluded)
.000
tailed)
212
212
212
212
N
Pearson
.550*’ .274** .475”
.408
1
Correlation
ISAS
Sig. (2.000 .000
.000
.000
tailed)
212
212
N
213
213
213
Pearson
.552** .295”
.507**
.435** .986”
1
Correlation
ISAS
Sig. (2.000 .000
.000
.000
Transformed
.000
tailed)
N
213
212
212
213
213
213
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); DERS = Difficulty in
Emotion Regulation Scale; ACS-24 - Action Control Scale; MSI-BPD = McLean
Screening Instrument for BPD; ISAS = Inventory o f Statements About Self-Injury.
. . .
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Model Testing
Path analysis is used to identify a theoretically meaningful, and optimally
parsimonious, causal model that demonstrates adequate model-data correspondence;
however, path analysis does not disconfirm other models (Kline, 2011). In the current
study, path analysis was performed using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to test
the proposed causal model. As illustrated in Figure 3, State Orientation, emotion
dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and NSSI behaviors were entered into the path model as
observed (i.e., manifest) variables. State Orientation was an exogenous variable and
emotion dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and NSSI behaviors were endogenous variables.
Regression analyses were used to generate path coefficients (i.e., standardized beta
weights, which were evaluated for significance and effect size. Goodness of model fit
(i.e., model-data correspondence) was systematically evaluated with model chi-square
'y

(X ) analyses, the Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and the Root Mean
Square Error Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990). Chi-square analyses are badness
o f fit suggesting that higher chi-square values indicate poorer model-data correspondence
and significant chi-square analyses indicate inadequate model-data correspondence. The
CFI is a goodness o f fit index that compares the specified model to an independent model
(all path coefficients equal zero); scores range from 0 to 1 with values closer to 1 being
preferred. The RMSEA is an incremental estimate o f the specified model’s fitness to the
data compared to the saturated (just-identified) model’s fitness; scores of .05 are
indicators o f good fit and scores o f .08 indicate adequate fit (Kline, 2011).
The specified model depicts theoretical cause-and-effect relationships among
State Orientation, emotion dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and NSSI behavior. According
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to the model, State Orientation is a biosocial predisposition to emotion dysregulation
which, in turn, leads to BPD symptoms and NSSI, independently. Additionally, the
specified model depicts an indirect effect of State Orientation on BPD symptoms and
NSSI behaviors. In the specified model, the path coefficient between BPD symptoms and
NSSI behaviors endorsed is fixed at zero, as depicted by the absence of a path between
the two variables. Each hypothesis is restated below as originally proposed, followed by
the results.

Hypothesis A l
There is a direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation. According
to the model, as State Orientation (as measured by the ACS-24) increases, emotion
dysregulation (as measured by the full-scale DERS) increases, that is, higher scores on
the ACS are associated with higher scores on the full-scale DERS. Specifically, State
Orientation is an exogenous variable that, according to the model, directly positively
affects emotion dysregulation (greater State Orientation, greater emotion dysregulation).

Hypothesis A l Results
Examination o f the standardized parameter coefficient indicates State Orientation
had a direct positive effect on emotion dysregulation (standardized coefficient = .59, p <
.01). As depicted in Figure 3, as State Orientation increased, emotion dysregulation
increased. Hypothesis A was supported.

Hypothesis A2
There is a direct effect of State Orientation on Borderline Personality Disorder
symptoms. According to the model, as State Orientation (as measured by the ACS-24)
increases, the number o f Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms endorsed on the
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MSI-BPD increases, that is, higher scores on the ACS-24 are positively associated with a
greater number o f Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms endorsed on the MSI-BPD.
Specifically, State Orientation is an exogenous variable that, according to the model,
directly positively affects Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms (greater State
Orientation, greater number o f BPD symptoms).

Hypothesis A2 Results
Examination o f the relevant standardized parameter coefficient indicates that
State Orientation did not have a direct effect on BPD symptoms reported (standardized
coefficient = .09, p = .15). Specifically, the bivariate relationship observed between State
Orientation and BPD symptoms {r =.44,/? < .01) in Table 10 was mediated by the effects
specified in the model. Hypothesis A2 was not supported.

Hypothesis A3
There is a direct effect of State Orientation on Nonsuicidal Self-injury. According
to the model, as State Orientation (as measured by the ACS-24) increases, the number of
Nonsuicidal Self-injurious behaviors endorsed on the Inventory o f Statements about Selfinjury Scale (ISAS) increases, that is, higher scores on the ACS-24 are positively
associated with a greater number o f self-injurious behaviors endorsed on the ISAS.
Specifically, State Orientation is an exogenous variable that, according to the model,
directly positively affects self-injurious behavior (greater State Orientation, greater
number o f NSSI behaviors).

Hypothesis A3 Results
Examination o f the relevant standardized parameter coefficient indicates State
Orientation did not have a direct effect on the number of NSSI behaviors endorsed
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(standardized coefficient = -.05,p = .47). These findings suggest the bivariate
relationship between State Orientation and NSSI behaviors (r =.30, p < .01) observed in
Table 10 was mediated by the effects specified in the model. Hypothesis A3 was not
supported.

Hypothesis B1
There is an indirect effect o f State Orientation on Borderline Personality Disorder
via emotion dysregulation. Emotion dysregulation is the mediator that, according to the
model, is affected by State Orientation (greater State Orientation, greater emotion
dysregulation); in turn, emotion dysregulation affects Borderline Personality Disorder
symptoms (greater emotion dysregulation, greater number of BPD symptoms).
Specifically, emotion dysregulation mediates the relationship between State Orientation
and Borderline Personality Disorder symptoms.

Hypothesis B1 Results
Examination o f the relevant standardized parameter coefficient indicates State
Orientation had an indirect effect on BPD symptoms reported through emotion
dysregulation (standardized coefficient = .34,/? < .01). These findings suggest that the
bivariate relationship between State Orientation and reported BPD symptoms observed in
the correlation matrix above (Table 10) was mediated by emotion dysregulation.
Hypothesis B 1 was supported.

Hypothesis B2
There is an indirect effect o f State Orientation on Nonsuicidal Self-injury via
emotion dysregulation. Emotion dysregulation is the mediator that, according to the
model, is affected by State Orientation (greater State Orientation, greater emotion
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dysregulation); in turn, emotion dysregulation affects self-injurious behavior (greater
emotion dysregulation, greater number o f NSSI behaviors endorsed). Specifically,
emotion dysregulation mediates the relationship between State Orientation and
Nonsuicidal Self-injury.

Hypothesis B2 Results
Examination o f the relevant standardized parameter coefficient indicates State
Orientation had an indirect effect on the number of NSSI behaviors endorsed through
emotion dysregulation (standardized coefficient = .34,/? < .01). These findings suggest
that the bivariate relationship between State Orientation and NSSI behaviors observed in
Table 10 was mediated by emotion dysregulation. Hypothesis B2 was supported.
In summary, there is a direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation,
and an indirect effect o f State Orientation on NSSI behavior and BPD symptoms.
Alternately, the hypothesized direct effect o f State Orientation on NSSI behavior and
BPD symptoms was not observed in the current study. Results indicate the bivariate
correlations between State Orientation, and NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms is
mediated by the other effects specified in the model.

Model Hypothesis
The specified model fits the data as well or better than a just-identified model.
Furthermore, we anticipate that the increased parsimony o f the over-identified model
compensates for the decrease in model fitness. The overall fitness of the specified model
does not significantly differ from an exact fit. The overall fitness o f the specified model
significantly differs from the just-identified model (saturated model) as indicated by a
non-significant chi-square difference test. Specifically, when the previously free

I ll
parameter (i.e., the path coefficient between BPD symptoms and NSSI methods) is fixed
at zero, the overall fit o f the model does not decrease significantly.

Model Hypothesis Results
In the current study, goodness o f model fit was evaluated with the model chisquare (y2), the Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and the Root Mean
Square Error Approximation (RMSEA; (Steiger, 1990). The specified model, shown in
Figure 4, demonstrated marginal model-data correspondence %2 (1, n = 213) = 3.70,/? =
.05, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .11. As anticipated, the saturated model (i.e., just-identified
model) demonstrated significantly better model-data correspondence %2 (0, n = 213) = .00
than the specified model. Despite the fact that the model demonstrated adequate modeldata correspondence, not all paths depicted in the model were statistically significant (see
Hypotheses A2 and A3). Therefore, the specified model was rejected.
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Figure 4 Specified Model

According to Kline (2011), equivalent model comparison is necessary in order to
demonstrate that a proposed model is a better explanation o f the underlying causes o f the
relationships depicted than a model with an equivalent number o f degrees o f freedom.
That is, equivalent models are tested to assure that the observed fitness o f the model is
due to the theoretical explanation provided by the model rather than as a result of chance.
Recall that all significance testing is based on chance (Kline, 2011). Therefore, when a
model that is consistent with the proposed theory fits the data as well or better than its
equivalent models, the causal theory underlying the specified model is supported.

In the current study, the equivalent models include seven variables: four observed
variables (State Orientation, emotion dysregulation, NSSI behaviors, BPD symptoms),
three unobserved variables (three error variances associated with the exogenous
variables, respectively), four exogenous variables (State Orientation), and three
endogenous variables emotion dysregulation, NSSI behaviors, BPD symptoms).
Model A, shown in Figure 5, is a recursive over-identified model. Model A
demonstrated good model-data correspondence y2 (1, n = 213) = .53, p = .47, CFI = 1,
RMSEA = 0. Examination o f the standardized parameter coefficient indicates State
Orientation had a direct effect on emotion dysregulation (standardized coefficient = .59, p
< .01). However, the direct effect of State Orientation on BPD symptoms was mediated
by the total effects specified in the model (standardized coefficient = . 10, p = . 12), and
the direct effect o f NSSI behaviors on BPD symptoms was mediated by the total effects
specified in the model (standardized coefficient = .12, p = .05). However, an indirect
effect o f State Orientation on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms was observed
(standardized coefficient = .32, p < .01; standardized coefficient = .30, p < .01). Although
Model A demonstrates an adequate model-data correspondence (i.e., non-significant chisquare analysis), the direct effect o f State Orientation on BPD symptoms was not
significant. As a result, Model A was rejected.
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Figure 5 Model A

Model B, shown in Figure 6, is a recursive over-identified model. Model-data
correspondence was poor x2 (1, n - 213) = 92.30, p < .00, CFI = .67, RMSEA = .66.
Examination o f the standardized path coefficient indicates State Orientation did not have
a direct effect on either NSSI behaviors or BPD symptoms (standardized coefficient = .05,p = .37; standardized coefficient = .10,/? = .06). Furthermore, there is no direct effect
of NSSI behaviors on BPD symptoms (standardized coefficient = .13 ,p = .05). There was
a direct effect o f emotion dysregulation on NSSI behaviors (standardized coefficient =
.57,p < .01) and on BPD symptoms (standardized coefficient = .53,/? < .01). Model B
was rejected.
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Figure 6 Model B

Model C, shown in Figure 7, is a recursive over-identified model. Model C
demonstrated good model-data correspondence x2 (1, « = 213) = 2.36, p = . 13, CFI = .99,
RMSEA = .08. Examination o f the standardized parameter coefficient indicates State
Orientation had a direct effect on emotion dysregulation (standardized coefficient = .59,/?
< .01). However, the direct effect of State Orientation on NSSI behaviors was mediated
by the total effects specified in the model (standardized coefficient = -.05, p = .47), and
the direct effect o f NSSI behaviors on BPD symptoms was mediated by the total effects
specified in the model (standardized coefficient = .12,/? = .07). A direct effect o f emotion
dysregulation on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms was observed (standardized
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coefficient = .58, p < .01; standardized coefficient = .58, p < .01). Although Model C
demonstrates good model-data correspondence (CFI = .99), the insignificant paths
depicted in the model indicate that Model C does not fit the data significantly better than
the specified model. Model C was rejected.

NSSI Behaviors

05

.12

State Orientation

Emotion Dysregulation

BPD Symptoms

Figure 7 Model C

Given that equivalent Models A and C are rejected due to insignificant paths, and
Model B was rejected due to poor model-data correspondence, the theory underlying the
relationships depicted in the specified model is not disconfirmed. Specifically, although
there are no direct effects o f State Orientation on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms,
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the direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation and the subsequent
indirect effects o f State Orientation on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms is consistent
with the theory. In order to return the theory underlying the specified model while
considering the results o f the above analyses, a theory-consistent model that derived from
the specified model including significant paths is tested. A model disconfirming the
proposed theory was tested and compared to the theory-consistent model.
The model presented in Figure 8 is a theory-consistent model in which the
relationship between NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms is mediated by the direct and
indirect effects o f State Orientation on the two phenomena through emotion
dysregulation. Alternately, the model presented in Figure 9 indicates a direct effect of
NSSI behaviors on BPD symptoms in addition to the direct and indirect effects depicted
in the theory-consistent model.
The theory-consistent model is a recursive over-identified model in which State
Orientation has a direct effect on emotion dysregulation and indirect effects on NSSI
behaviors and BPD symptoms. The theory-consistent model demonstrated moderate
model-data correspondence %2(3, n = 213) = 6.26, p = .10, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .07.
Examination o f the standardized parameter coefficient indicates an indirect effect of State
Orientation on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms (standardized coefficient = .32,/? <
.01; standardized coefficient = .38,/? < .01). A direct effect o f State Orientation on
emotion dysregulation was observed (standardized coefficient = .59,/? < .01). The
theory-consistent model is retained because all paths in the model depict significant
relationships and the model demonstrates good model-data correspondence.
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Note: Path coefficients depicted in Figure 8 represent direct effects between variables.
The indirect effects discussed below are represented by the path coefficients discussed in
the text.
Figure 8 Theory-Consistent Model

The theory-inconsistent model, shown in Figure 9, is a recursive over-identified
model in which State Orientation has a direct effect on emotion dysregulation and
indirect effects on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms and NSSI behaviors have a direct
effect on BPD symptoms. The theory-inconsistent model demonstrated good model-data
correspondence %2 (2, n = 213) = 2.89,p = .24, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05. Examination of
the standardized parameter coefficient indicates a direct effect o f State Orientation on
emotion dysregulation (standardized coefficient = .59, p < .01), and an indirect effect of
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State Orientation on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms (standardized coefficient = .32,
p < .01; standardized coefficient = .34,/? < .01). The direct effect o f NSSI behaviors on
BPD symptoms (standardized coefficient = .12,/? = .07) was not significant, suggesting
that the other effects depicted in the model mediated the relationship between the two
phenomena. Thus, after accounting for the direct effects o f State Orientation on emotion
dysregulation and the indirect effects o f State Orientation on NSSI behaviors and BPD
symptoms, the causal relationship depicted in the theory-inconsistent model is no longer
significant. The theory-inconsistent model was rejected.

NSSI Bahavkx*

.55

12

State Oriantation

Emotion Dysrsgulation

58

BPD Symptoms

Note: Path coefficients depicted in Figure 8 represent direct effects between variables.
The indirect effects discussed below are represented by the path coefficients discussed in
the text.
Figure 9 Theory-Inconsistent Model
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None o f the models that demonstrated adequate model-data correspondence had
significant path coefficients that depicted a direct effect of State Orientation on NSSI
behaviors or BPD symptoms, or a direct effect o f NSSI behaviors on BPD symptoms. Of
the models that demonstrated adequate model-data correspondence, the model most
consistent with the proposed theory is a mediation model in which the relationship
between BPD symptoms and NSSI behaviors is fully mediated by the indirect effects of
State Orientation on the two phenomena.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The purpose o f this study was to determine whether NSSI should be considered a
unique disorder (as defined in the DSM-5, Section III). This is a relevant topic given the
recent call for the continued examination o f NSSI as a unique disorder, separate from
BPD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Selby et al., 2012;
Shaffer & Jacobson, 2010). The current study is grounded in PSI theory, and contends
that State Orientation is a dispositional characteristic directly associated with emotion
dysregulation and indirectly associated with NSSI. Path analysis was employed to test a
model in which the direct and indirect effects o f State Orientation would mediate the
relationship between NSSI and BPD. The results o f this study supports the contention of
Shaffer and Jacobson (2010) that NSSI be considered a unique disorder as well as the
recent research o f Selby and colleagues (2012) which indicated that NSSI was a distinct
clinical condition, separate from BPD.

Findings
Model Hypothesis
The hypothesized causal model suggested that State Orientation is a dispositional
characteristic (Kuhl, 1994) that leads to emotion dysregulation, BPD symptoms,
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and Nonsuicidal Self-injury. The current study examined the overall model-data
correspondence o f the specified model, and compared it to three equivalent models (i.e.,
Model A, Model B, Model C). Given that the specified model and the equivalent models
did not exhibit adequate model-data correspondence (including fit index and/or
significant path coefficients), ad-hoc models were tested. The model most consistent with
the theoretical argument o f the specified model was retained. The theory-consistent
model demonstrated a direct relationship between State Orientation and emotion
dysregulation, and indirect effects on NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms.

Hypothesis A1
Based on the assumption that State Orientation (Kuhl, 2000a, 2011) is a construct
similar to rumination (Kuhl & Baumann, 2000; Selby et al., 2009; Selby & Joiner, 2009),
which leads to dysregulated emotion (Hilt et al., 2008; Selby et al., 2009; Selby & Joiner,
2009), it was hypothesized that there is a direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion
dysregulation. The direct effect of State Orientation on emotion dysregulation explained
the most variance depicted in the model. Statistical results support the theoretical
argument that a dispositional characteristic (e.g., State Orientation) can be a risk factor
for difficulty regulating one’s emotions.

Hypothesis A2
Given that recent research indicates rumination is positively associated with BPD
(Kuhl, 2000a; Selby et al., 2009; Selby & Joiner, 2009), it was hypothesized that State
Orientation is positively associated with BPD symptoms. Results showed that after the
direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation was accounted for, there was
no longer a significant relationship between State Orientation and BPD symptoms. This
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suggests that State Orientation does not directly lead to BPD symptoms; rather, State
Orientation is a risk factor for BPD symptoms through emotion dysregulation.

Hypothesis A3
Recent research indicates rumination (i.e., State Orientation; Kuhl & Baumann,
2000; Kuhl, 2000b) leads to NSSI (Hilt et al., 2008; Selby et al., 2012). Therefore, a
direct effect o f State Orientation on NSSI behaviors was hypothesized. Results showed
that after the direct effect o f State Orientation on emotion dysregulation is statistically
controlled, the bivariate relationship observed between State Orientation and NSSI
symptoms was no longer significant, indicating mediation effects. This suggests that after
the variance between State Orientation and emotion dysregulation is accounted for, the
shared variance between State Orientation and the other variables specified in the model
is reduced.

Hypothesis B1
Recent research suggests that rumination (i.e., State Orientation) leads to emotion
dysregulation (i.e., an emotional cascade), which in turn, results in the emergence of BPD
symptoms (Selby et al., 2009, 2012; Selby & Joiner, 2009). It was hypothesized that State
Orientation would have an indirect effect on BPD symptoms through emotion
dysregulation. This hypothesis was supported, suggesting that although State Orientation
does not cause BPD symptoms, it indirectly leads to BPD symptoms through emotion
dysregulation.

Hypothesis B2
Recent research suggests that rumination (i.e., State Orientation) leads to emotion
dysregulation (i.e., an emotional cascade), which in turn, leads to dysregulated behavior,
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including NSSI (Selby et al., 2012; Selby & Joiner, 2009). It was hypothesized that State
Orientation would have an indirect effect on NSSI behaviors through emotion
dysregulation. This hypothesis was supported, suggesting that although State Orientation
does not cause NSSI behaviors, it indirectly leads to self-injury through emotion
dysregulation.

Implications
Currently, criterion 5 of BPD is the only diagnostic criterion in the DSM-5 that
speaks to intentional non-suicidal, self-inflicted injury that is non-repetitive and nonstereotypical (e.g., as present in various forms of mental retardation or pervasive
developmental disorders or stereotypic movement disorders). According to the DSM-5,
self-injury is commonly considered a pathogenic marker for BPD, and is accompanied by
conscious functional mechanisms and impulsivity associated with disinhibition. Under
the diagnostic criteria outlined in Section III o f DSM-5, criterion A for NSSI disorder
would include five or more instances o f self-injury in the past 12 months, motivated by a
desire to alter a negative affective or cognitive state. Results o f this study suggest NSSI is
distinct from BPD. The relationship between NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms was
mediated by the effects in all models. This suggests that rather than NSSI leading to
BPD, there are underlying causes that are shared by the two phenomena.
State Orientation alone does not predispose one to engagement in NSSI. Rather,
State Orientation predisposes one to emotion dysregulation, which in turn leads to NSSI.
Similarly, State Orientation does not have a direct effect on BPD symptoms, but is a risk
factor for emotion dysregulation, which in turn leads to BPD symptoms. In other words,
State Orientation is a dispositional characteristic that predisposes one to emotion

125
dysregulation, a risk factor for both NSSI and BPD. Individuals who are state-oriented,
that is, unable to access the holistic self under duress, are more likely to experience
emotion dysregulation. Therefore, these individuals have an increased risk of engagement
in NSSI behaviors or to experience BPD symptoms.
State Orientation is a dispositional trait developed through the interaction of
temperamental characteristics and environmental influences (Kuhl, 2000a). Dispositional
traits combine to form characteristic adaptations (McAdams, 2006), which are behavioral
representations o f personality. According to the retained model, dysregulated behavior
(e.g., NSSI) can result from emotion dysregulation in the absence o f a personality
disorder (i.e., BPD). Thus, these findings suggest State Orientation may in fact interfere
with executive functioning, including behavioral inhibition and activation o f the holistic
self (Kuhl, 2011). Future research should examine the interaction effects noted in
Baumann and colleagues (2007) in order to more fully explore NSSI within the context of
PSI Theory and the modulation assumptions.
The retained model (i.e., the theory-consistent model) suggests that NSSI
behaviors and BPD symptoms may be indicative o f an underlying emotion regulation
deficit that leads to emotional lability, interpersonal deficits, inadequate problem solving,
and dysregulated behavior motivated by impulsive urgency. These findings are especially
important given that recent research suggests State Orientation can be reduced (Kuhl et
al., 2006) and emotion regulation skills can be developed (Gratz, Chapman, & Walsh,
2009). If self-injury and BPD were conceptualized as both being caused by emotion
dysregulation, then treatments emphasizing the development of emotion regulation skills
would ameliorate both the presentation of NSSI behaviors and BPD symptoms.
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Continued examination o f the causal trajectory leading to NSSI behavior and BPD
symptoms via emotion dysregulation is warranted.

Limitations
A limitation o f the current study is sampling bias. As noted above, the current
sample was recruited from the researcher’s personal social network using a snowball
technique. Participants were primarily recruited via internet-based social networking
venues including Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter, and various other social media. Given that
the study was distributed via social media venues, participants with an interest in the
study’s subject matter were more likely to respond to the study. Additionally, there was a
large proportion o f female respondents, as well as older, more highly educated, and
financially advantaged participants. As is typical o f survey research, the results are
limited by the use o f self-report measures. Also, given that the sample was collected from
the researcher’s personal contacts and social media network, the generalizability of the
study is tentative. Future research should compare the current sample to samples from
other populations, such as college students, children and/or adolescents, or clinical
samples.
The findings o f this study are limited by the research design and statistical
analyses. Because path analysis is limited to continuous measured variables and assumes
that there are no interaction effects depicted in the model, undetected interaction effects
may be present. Given that research examining PSI theory has observed interaction
effects, a limitation o f the current study was that the variables were conceptualized as
continuous measures.
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Directions for Future Research
Future research should examine whether categorical variables based on presence
and/or thresholds better explain the theory underlying the relationships among the
variables o f interest. For example, the threshold for BPD symptoms greater than or equal
to five could be used to conceptualize BPD as a diagnostic category rather than a degree
o f symptomology. Future research should test the retained model with different samples.
The current sample had a mean age o f 37 years which is substantially older than other
samples examining NSSI. Further, age was significantly negatively correlated with all of
the measured variables included in the path model. This suggests that as individuals
mature, State Orientation, emotion dysregulation, BPD symptoms, and NSSI behaviors
decrease. This is consistent with earlier research that found self-injury begins in
childhood (Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004; Whitlock et al., 2006), that NSSI is most
prevalent in youth, with average age o f onset between 12 and 16 years (Klonsky, 2011),
and that NSSI is common among young adults with median rates o f 17% reported
(Klonsky et al., 2011). However, there has been little population-level assessment of
NSSI behaviors. Comparative studies should use a college sample and/or have
respondents complete the compiled survey in a paper format. Additionally, a clinical
sample could be obtained to explore the model-data correspondence of the retained model
and any other acceptable models that adequately explain underlying relationships
represented.
Future research could employ confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to generate a
measurement model in which the measured variables are latent variables. Latent variable
analysis regresses items onto their respective subscales, and subscales are regressed onto
a latent overall construct. The advantage o f incorporating CFA into the data is that it

allows for the deletion or exclusion o f scales or items not adequately related to the
construct o f interest. For example, if four items from a scale adequately predicted a latent
construct, additional items for the scale could be excluded, thereby creating variables that
can be measured with fewer items. Additionally, items or scales, with significant inter
item (scale) correlations (e.g., > or = .80) would be eliminated due to redundancy. The
development and employment o f concise measures increases the internal validity of a
model. Path analysis relies on scale scores, whereas SEM techniques such as latent class
analysis allow for mixture modeling which may have superior utility with low frequency
variables, pathological constructs, violations o f assumptions o f normality, and diagnostic
utility. Analysis using SEM techniques would allow for differential diagnosis and clinical
conceptualization. As noted in Armey & Crowther (2008), infrequently occurring
phenomena (often those associated with pathology) may be better conceptualized in
nonlinear terms, or according to thresholds. Alternately, items may be weighted
depending on their discriminate and/or predictive validity.
Interestingly, several individuals in the study who endorsed at least one o f the
NSSI behaviors did not endorse item 2 o f the MSI-BPD. Item 2 o f the MSI-BPD states,
“Have you deliberately hurt yourself physically (e.g., punched yourself, cut yourself,
burned yourself)? How about made a suicide attempt?” In other words, does the inclusion
o f the statement, “How about made a suicide attempt?” alter participant responses to the
question? It’s possible the inclusion o f the statement regarding a suicide attempt may lead
participants to not endorse this item, which would support the argument that NSSI is not
a suicidal gesture but a coping mechanism. Future research should examine how the
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wording o f this item affects participant responses, specifically, whether item 2 o f the
MSI-BPD should be two separate items rather than a single item.

Conclusion
The results o f this study support the recent findings o f Selby, Bender, Gordon,
Nock, and Joiner (2012) in which logistic regression analyses suggested NSSI was a
distinct clinical condition, distinct from BPD specifically. Although NSSI Disorder is
currently categorized as a condition in need o f further research in the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), these findings are consistent with the contention that
NSSI should be a distinct disorder. In the same way that exhibiting one diagnostic
criterion is not indicative o f having the disorder, engagement in self-injurious behavior is
not sufficient for a diagnosis of BPD. Similar to the emotional cascade model (Selby &
Joiner, 2009), these findings suggest emotion dysregulation and its accompanying
behavioral dysregulation are critical indicators o f self-injurious behavior and BPD
symptoms, potentially explaining much o f the disturbance and distress associated with
the behavior and disorder. Research should examine risk factors associated with emotion
dysregulation (e.g., childhood maltreatment; Gratz & Roemer, 2008); preventative factors
associated with adequate emotion regulation (Koole & Fockenberg, 2011; Koole, Kuhl,
Jostmann, & Finkenauer, 2006), and ameliorative interventions (Kuhl, 2011).
According to the retained model (i.e., the theory-consistent model presented in
Figure 8), State Orientation is a dispositional risk factor for emotion dysregulation which
leads to engagement in NSSI behavior and/or BPD symptoms. Emotion dysregulation is a
multidimensional risk factor for behavioral dysregulation, intrapersonal turmoil, and
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interpersonal conflict. Future research will replicate and extend the current study,
examining the functional components of NSSI behavior across various demographic
categories.
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1. How old are y o u ?_____________
2. What is your gender?
Female

Male

Other (please specify)

4. Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual,
pansexual, or something else?
Heterosexual

Homosexual

Asexual

Pansexual

Bisexual
Something else (please specify)

5. Please indicate your highest level o f education completed.
Grammar School

High School or equivalent

Vocational/Technical School

(2 year) Some College

College Graduate (4 year)

Master's Degree (MS)

Doctoral Degree (PhD)Professional Degree (MD, JD, etc.) Other (please specify)
6. Please indicate your current household income in U.S. dollars
Rather not say
< $ 10,000

$10,000 - $ 19,999

$20,000 - $29,999

$30,000 - $39,999

$40,000 - $49,999

$50,000 - $74,999

$75,000 - $99,999

$100,000 - $150,000

>$150,000

7. Do you co n sid er y o u rself C hristian, Jew ish, B uddhist, M uslim , Hindu, a follow er o f so m e o th e r
religion, o r n o t religious?

Christian

Jewish

Buddhist

Not religious

Other (please specify)

Muslim

8. How did you learn about the study?_____________________

Hindu
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H A KE M P-24 (Action C ontrol Scale: ACS)
Identification #:___________

Date:_____________________

A g e:___________ years

Sex: [ ] f

[ ]m

The following questions have two different answers. Please choose the alternative (A
or B) that applies best to you.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

When I have lost something valuable and can't find it anywhere:
(

) A) I have a hard time concentrating on anything else.

(

) B) I don't

dwell on it.

When I know I must finish something soon:
(

) A) I have to push myself to get started.

(

) B) I find it easy to get it done and over with.

When I've worked for weeks on one project and then everything goes completely
wrong:
(

) A) It takes me a long time to get over it.

(

) B) It bothers me for a while, but then I don't think aboutit anymore.

When I don't have anything in particular to do and I am getting bored:
(

) A) I have trouble getting up enough energy to do anything at all.

(

) B) I quickly find something to do.

When I'm in a competition and lose every time:
(

) A) I can soon put losing out of my mind.

(

) B) The thought that I lost keeps running through my mind.

When I am getting ready to tackle a difficult problem:
(

) A) It feels like I am facing a big mountain that I don't think I can climb.

(

) B) I look for a way that the problem can be approached in a

suitable manner.
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7.

8.

9.

10.

If I had just bought a new piece o f equipment (for example, a laptop) and it
accidentally fell on the floor and was damaged beyond repair:
(

) A) I would get over it quickly.

(

) B) It would take me a while to get over it.

When I have to solve a difficult problem:
(

) A) I usually get on it right away.

(

) B) Other things go through my mind before I can get down to working on the
problem.

When I have to talk to someone about something important and, repeatedly, can 't
find her/him at home:
(

) A) I can't stop thinking about it, even while I'm doing something else.

(

) B) I easily forget about it until I can see the person again.

When I have to make up my mind about what I am going to do when I get some
unexpected free time:
(

) A) It takes me a while to decide what I should do.

( ) B) I can usually decide on something to do without having to think it over
very much.
11.

12.

13.

14.

When I've bought a lot of stuff at a store and realize when I get home that I paid
too much - but I can't get my money back:
(

) A) I can't concentrate on anything else.

(

) B) I easily forget about it.

When I have work to do at home:
(

) A) It is often hard for me to get started.

(

) B) I usually get started right away.

When I am told that my work has been completely unsatisfactory:
(

) A) I don't let it bother me for too long.

(

) B) I feel paralyzed.

When I have a lot o f important things to do:
(

) A) I often don't know where to begin.

(

) B)

I

find it easy to make a plan and stick with it.
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15.

16.

When I'm stuck in traffic and miss an important appointment:
(

) A) At first, it's difficult for me to start doing anything else at all.

(

) B) I quickly forget about it and focus on something else.

When there are two things that I really want to do, but I can't do both o f them:
A) I quickly begin one thing and forget about the other.
B) It's not easy for me to put the thing that I couldn't do out o f my mind.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

When something is very important to me, but I can't seem to get it right:
(

) A) I gradually lose heart.

(

) B) I just forget about it and go do something else.

When I have to carry out an important but unpleasant task:
(

) A) I do it and get it over with.

(

) B) It can take a while before I can bring myself to do it.

When something really gets me down:
(

) A) I have trouble doing anything at all.

(

) B) I find it easy to distract myself by doing other things.

When I am facing a big project that has to be done:
(

) A) I often spend too long thinking about where I should begin.

(

) B) I don't have any problems getting started.

When several things go wrong on the same day:
(

) A) I don’t know how to deal with it.

(

) B) I just keep on going as though nothing had happened.

When I have a boring assignment:
(

) A) I usually don't have any problem getting through it.

(

) B) I sometimes just can't get moving on it.

When I have put all my effort into doing a really good job on something and the
whole thing doesn't work out:
(

) A) I don't have too much difficulty starting something else.

(

) B) I have trouble doing anything else at all.

When I have an obligation to do something that is boring and uninteresting:
(

) A) I do it and get it over with.

(

) B) It usually takes a while before I get around to doing it.
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Action Control Scale (ACS-24)
(English version of the German HAKEMP-24)
Julius Kuhl, University o f OsnabrUck,
SeminarstraBe 20, 49074 Osnabruck
Unit o f "Differentielle Psychologie and Personlichkeitsforschung"

The action control scale consists of three subscales:
1.
2.

Action orientation subsequent to failure vs. preoccupation (AOF)
Prospective and decision-related action orientation vs. hesitation (AOD)

Each scale consists o f 12 items, which describe a particular situation. Each item has two
alternative answers (A or B), one o f which is indicative o f action orientation and the other
o f state orientation.
For scoring the test values, using the action-oriented answers is recommended. The sum
o f the action-oriented answers for each scale is between 0 and 12.
The items are numbered from 1-24. Which items belong to which scale, and which
choice alternative is indicative of action orientation, can be found in the following key:
1.

Failure-related action orientation vs. preoccupation (AOF)
IB, 3B, 5A, 7A, 9B, 1 IB, 13A, 15B, 17B, 19B, 21B, 23A

2.

Decision-related action orientation vs. hesitation (AOD1
2B, 4B, 6B, 8A, 10B, 12B, 14B, 16A, 18A, 20B, 22A, 24A

When scoring the questionnaire, the two scales should be scored separately, since each
scale deals with a different behavioral aspect of action orientation. The scales AOF and
AOD should always be administered together.

APPENDIX C

DIFFICULTIES IN EMOTION REGULATION SCALE (DERS)
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Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS)

1: Nonacceptance of Emotional Responses (NONACCEPTANCE)
29) When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way.
25) When I’m upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way.
15) When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way.
14) When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way.
33) When I’m upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way.
27) When I’m upset, I feel like I am weak.

2: Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior (GOALS)
30) When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating.
22) When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things.
16) When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done.
38) When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else.
24) When I’m upset, I can still get things done, (r)

3: Impulse Control Difficulties (IMPULSE)
37) When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviors.
31) When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.
17) When I’m upset, I become out o f control.
23) When I’m upset, I feel out of control.
4) I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control.
28) When I’m upset, I feel like I can remain in control o f my behaviors, (r)
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4: Lack of Emotional Awareness (AWARENESS)
7) I am attentive to my feelings, (r)
3) I pay attention to how I feel, (r)
12) When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions, (r)
21) When I’m upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important, (r)
9) I care about what I am feeling, (r)
39) When I’m upset, I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling, (r)

5: Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies (STRATEGIES)
20) When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed.
19) When I’m upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time.
35) When I’m upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do.
40) When I’m upset, it takes me a long time to feel better.
32) When I’m upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better.
26) When I’m upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better, (r)
41) When I’m upset, my emotions feel overwhelming.
34) When I’m upset, I start to feel very bad about myself.

6: Lack of Emotional Clarity (CLARITY)
6) I have difficulty making sense out o f my feelings.
5) I have no idea how I am feeling.
10) I am confused about how I feel.

8) I know exactly how I am feeling, (r)
1) I am clear about my feelings, (r)
Note, (r) indicates reverse-scored item.

APPENDIX D
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INVENTORY OF STATEMENTS ABOUT SELF-INJURY (ISAS)SECTION I. BEHAVIORS
This questionnaire asks about a variety of self-harm behaviors. Please only endorse a behavior
if you have done it intentionally (i.e., on purpose) and without suicidal intent (i.e., not for
suicidal reasons).

1. Please estimate the number of times in your life you have intentionally (i.e., on purpose)
performed each type of non-suicidal self-harm (e.g., 0,10,100,500):
Cutting________ ______
Severe Scratching
Biting

_____

Banging or Hitting Self

Burning

______

Interfering w /W ound Healing
(e.g., picking scabs)

Carving_______ ______

Rubbing Skin Against Rough Surface

Pinching_____________

Sticking Self w/ Needles

Pulling Hair

Swallowing Dangerous Substances

_____

O ther________________ ,________

i e k ' k k i e k k k k k ' k i e k k k ' k ’k k i e k k ' k ' k k i e k k k k i c i e k k ' k k k k i e k k ' k ' k i c k k k ’k k ' k k i e ' k k ' k ' k k i e k k ' k i e k k k ' k k ' k ' k k i e k i c i t ' k i c i e ' k i e

********************** Important'. If you have performed one or more of the behaviors
listed above, please complete the final part of this questionnaire. If you have not performed
any of the behaviors listed above, you are done with this particular questionnaire and
should continue to the next.
' k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k 'k - k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k lt'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k ’k ' k ’k ' k ' k ' k ' k ’k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k '& 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k 'k
' k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k 'k k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k 'k ' k 'k
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2. If you feel that you have a main form of self-harm, please circle the behavior(s)
on the first page above that you consider to be your main form of self-harm.

3. At what age did you:
First harm yourself? ________________

Most recently harm yourself? _________
(approximate date - month/date/year)

4. Do you experience physical pain during self-harm?
Please circle a choice:

YES

SOMETIMES

NO

SOMETIMES

NO

5. When you self-harm, are you alone?
Please circle a choice:

YES

6. Typically, how much time elapses from the time you have the urge to self-harm until you
act on the urge?
Please circle a choice:
< 1 hour

1 - 3 hours

3 - 6 hours

6 - 1 2 hours

12 - 24 hours

> 1 day

7. Do/did you want to stop self-harming?
Please circle a choice:

YES

NO
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INVENTORY OF STATEMENTS ABOUT SELF-INJURY (ISAS)SECTIONII. FUNCTIONS
Name:__________________
Date:___________________

Instructions
This inventory was written to help us better understand the experience of non-suicidal selfharm. Below is a list o f statements that may or may not be relevant to your experience of selfharm. Please identify the statements that are most relevant for you:
•
•
•

Circle Q if the statement not relevant for you at all
Circle 1 if the statement is somewhat relevant for you
Circle 2 if the statement is very relevant for you

“W hen I self-harm , I am ...

Response

1. ... calming myself down

0

1

2 . . . . creating a boundary between myself and others

0

1 2

3. ... punishing myself

0

1 2

4. ... giving m yself a way to care for myself (by attending to the wound)

0

1 2

5. ... causing pain so I will stop feeling numb

0

1

6. ... avoiding the impulse to attempt suicide

0

1 2

I. ... doing something to generate excitement or exhilaration

0

1 2

8. ... bonding with peers

0

1 2

9. ... letting others know the extent o f my emotional pain

0

1 2

1 0 .... seeing if I can stand the pain

0

1

2

II. ... creating a physical sign that I feel awful

0

1

2

1 2 .... getting back at someone

0

1 2

13. ... ensuring that I am self-sufficient

0

1 2

1 4 .... releasing emotional pressure that has built up inside of me

0

1 5 .... demonstrating that I am separate from other people

0

1

1 6 .... expressing anger towards myself for being worthless or stupid

0

1 2

1

2

2

2
2
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“When I self-harm, I am ...
17. ... creating a physical injury that is easier to care for than my emotional
distress
1 8 .... trying to feel something (as opposed to nothing) even if it is physical pain

0
0

1

2

19. ... responding to suicidal thoughts without actually attempting suicide

0

1

2

2 0 .... entertaining m yself or others by doing something extreme

0

1

2

21. ... fitting in with others

0

1

2

22. ... seeking care or help from others

0

1

2

23.... demonstrating I am tough or strong

0

1

2

2 4 .... proving to m yself that my emotional pain is real

0

25. ... getting revenge against others

0

1

2

26. ... demonstrating that I do not need to rely on others for help

0

1

2

27. ... reducing anxiety, frustration, anger, or other overwhelming emotions

0

1

2

28. ... establishing a barrier between m yself and others

0

1 2

29. ... reacting to feeling unhappy with myself or disgusted with myself

0

1

2

30. ... allowing m yself to focus on treating the injury, which can be
gratifying or satisfying
31. ... making sure I am still alive when I don’t feel real

0

1

2

0

1

2

32. ... putting a stop to suicidal thoughts

0

1

2

33. ... pushing my limits in a manner akin to skydiving or other extreme
activities
3 4 .... creating a sign o f friendship or kinship with friends or loved ones

0

1

2

0

1

2

35. ... keeping a loved one from leaving or abandoning me

0

1

2

3 6 .... proving I can take the physical pain

0

1

2

37. ... signifying the emotional distress I’m experiencing
3 8 .... trying to hurt someone close to me
39. ... establishing that I am autonomous/independent

0
0
0

1

1

2

2

1
1
1

2
2
2
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(Optional) In the space below, please list any statements that you feel would be more accurate
for you than the ones listed above:

(Optional) In the space below, please list any statements you feel should be added to the above
list, even if they do not necessarily apply to you:
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ITEMS COMPRISING EACH OF 13 FUNCTIONS SCALES
Affect Regulation - 1, 14, 27
Interpersonal Boundaries - 2, 15, 28
Self-Punishment - 3, 16, 29
Self-Care- 4 . 17,30
Anti-Dissociation/Feeling-Generation - 5, 18, 31
Anti-Suicide - 6. 19, 32
Sensation-Seeking - 7, 20,33
Peer-Bonding - 8,21, 34
Interpersonal Influence - 9, 22, 35
Toughness - 10, 23, 36
Marking Distress - 11, 24,37
Revenge - 12, 25, 38
Autonomy - 13,26, 39

Scores for each o f the 13 functions range from 0 to 6.

Psychometric properties of Section I (Behaviors') are reported in:
Klonsky, E.D. & Olino, T.M. (2008). Identifying clinically distinct subgroups o f selfinjurers among young adults: A latent class analysis. Journal o f Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 76, 22-27.
Psychometric properties o f Section II (Functions) are reported in:
Klonsky, E.D. & Glenn, C.G. (2009) Assessing the functions o f non-suicidal self-injury:
Psychometric properties o f the Inventory o f Statements About Self-injury (ISAS). Journal
o f Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 31, 215-219.

APPENDIX E
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McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder

1.

Have any o f your closest relationships been troubled by
a lot o f arguments or repeated breakups?

1 = yes 0 = no

2.

Have you deliberately hurt yourself physically (e.g.,
punched yourself, cut yourself, burned yourself)?

1= yes 0 = no

How about made a suicide attempt?
3.

Have you had at least two other problems with
impulsivity (e.g., eating binges and spending sprees,
drinking too much and verbal outbursts)?

1= yes 0 = no

4.

Have you been extremely moody?

1= yes 0 = no

5.

Have you felt very angry a lot o f the time? How about
often acted in an angry or sarcastic manner?

1 = yes 0 = no

6.

Have you often been distrustful of other people?

1= yes 0 = no

7.

8.
9.

Have you frequently felt unreal or as if things around
you were unreal?
Have you chronically felt empty?
Have you often felt that you had no idea o f who you are
or that you have no identity?

10. Have you made desperate efforts to avoid feeling
abandoned or being abandoned (e.g., repeatedly called
someone to reassure yourself that he or she still cared,
begged them not to leave you, clung to them
physically)?

1 = yes 0 = no

1= yes 0 = no
1 = yes 0 = no

1= yes 0 = no

APPENDIX F

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE APPROVAL FORM
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LOUISIANA T E C H
U N I V E R S I T Y
MEMORANDUM
O FFICE O F UNIVERSITY RESEARCH

TO:

Mrs. Desiree’ LeBoeuf-Davis and Dr. Donna Thomas

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

December 16,2013

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:

“The Effects of State Orientation on Emotion and Behavior Regulation”
HUC 1162
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy o f the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part o f the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval
o f the involvement o f human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on December 16, 2013 and
this project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB if the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond December 16, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office o f University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion of the study. If changes occur
in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.
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